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MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND SENTENCING DISPARITIES
E. LEA JOHNSTON* & CONOR P. FLYNN**
INTRODUCTION

M

ENTAL health courts are an understudied, yet burgeoning, phenomenon.1 Propelled by federal funding and the strong support of
the Council of State Governments’ Justice Center,2 mental health courts
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1. Generally speaking, mental health courts are specialized criminal courts
with dockets restricted to individuals with mental illnesses in which defendants
choose a non-adversarial, problem-solving approach involving court-supervised
treatment instead of traditional court processing. See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing
Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 520–21 (2012). Mental health
courts are idiosyncratic and vary widely in their mental health and criminal eligibility criteria, plea requirements, treatments offered, intensity and length of supervision, use of jail as a potential sanction for condition noncompliance, and the
impact of program completion on participants’ criminal cases. See id.
2. See Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa) (authorizing funding, training, and technical assistance for collaborative efforts between criminal justice and mental health agencies, including mental health
courts); America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project Act of 2000, Pub.
L. 106-515 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711, 3793, 3796ii–3796ii-7) (granting
funding for development or expansion of mental health courts); The Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS’ JUST. CTR., https://
csgjusticecenter.org/mental-health-projects/report-of-the-consensus-project/
[https://perma.cc/FW9H-2PYY] (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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have enjoyed exponential growth, expanding from the first court in 19973
to over 400 courts across 43 states today.4 Supporters maintain that these
courts deliver much-needed treatment to individuals suffering from
mental illness, reduce recidivism, improve quality of life,5 and even help
diminish mass incarceration.6 Proponents also tout the courts as models
for treating defendants with dignity, facilitating defendants’ “voice,” and
embodying other important procedural justice principles.7
Very little attention has been paid, however, to the effects of mental
health courts on criminal justice outcomes.8 To date, most research has
focused on whether they curtail recidivism.9 To a lesser extent, studies
3. See LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS’ JUST.
CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRAC2 (2009), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG_MHC_Research.pdf
TICE
[https://perma.cc/WL9Y-FFEV].
4. See Adult Mental Health Treatment Court Locator, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/gains-center/mental-health-treatment-court-locator/adults [https://perma.cc/83TH-B2XE] (last updated Aug. 19,
2015) (depicting at least one mental health court in each state except Rhode Island, New Jersey, Connecticut, Arkansas, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Wyoming);
How Many Problem-Solving Courts Are There?, NAT’L DRUG COURT RES. CTR., http://
www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-problem-solving-courts-are-there (June 30,
2014) [https://perma.cc/JWB4-35ST] (reporting 414 mental health courts as of
June 30, 2014).
5. See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich et al., Is Diversion Swift? Comparing Mental Health
Court and Traditional Criminal Justice Processing, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 420, 431
(2012) (“The short-term benefits of getting out of jail must be juxtaposed with the
potential for longer-term benefits of MHC participation (i.e., access to treatment,
reductions in recidivism, improved quality of life).”).
6. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
595, 606, 609–13 (2016) (asserting that treatment courts “are generally considered
a leading alternative to incarceration” and discussing the role of problem-solving
courts in the Department of Justice’s Justice Reinvestment Initiative); Roger K.
Warren, A Tale of Two Surveys: Judicial and Public Perspectives on State Sentencing Reform, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 276, 282 (2009) (observing that 82% of respondents in
2006 survey by the National Center for State Courts said mental health courts are
“a better way to sentence offenders than through the regular court system”).
7. See Michael L. Perlin, “The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: Mental Health
Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 1, 2, 8, 20–23, 27–28
(2013).
8. See Allison D. Redlich et al., Patterns of Practice in Mental Health Courts: A
National Survey, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 359 (2006) (highlighting “open questions” of whether mental health courts “Do justice well?,” which is an issue “in
need of future research”).
9. See, e.g., Laura N. Honegger, Does the Evidence Support the Case for Mental
Health Courts? A Review of the Literature, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 478, 482–85 (2015)
(collecting and reviewing extant studies on mental health courts’ abilities to reduce recidivism rates); Donald M. Linhorst & P. Ann Dirks-Linhorst, Development,
Outcomes, and Future Challenges, 54 JUDGES’ J. no.2, 2015, at 22 (same); Evan Lowder
et al., Recidivism Following Mental Health Court Exit: Between and Within-Group Comparisons, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 118, 119 (2016) (“Together, findings of the extant
research suggest that participation in MHCs decreases recidivism for justice-involved adults with mental illnesses, though effectiveness can vary as a function of
characteristics of the participants and the program.”). While the weight of extant
studies suggest that mental health courts may reduce recidivism, “limitations and
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have also assessed their abilities to improve participants’ psychiatric symptoms, connection to behavioral health services, and quality of life.10
There has thus far been virtually no investigation of differences in sentencing practices between mental health and traditional criminal courts.11
This Article is the first to fill that void.
In an absence of empirical scrutiny, competing narratives have arisen
about the sentencing effects of mental health courts. While some defense
attorneys and occasional media accounts have observed that these courts
may mete out excessive sentences,12 public discourse largely assumes that
mental health courts offer systematic leniency to offenders with mental
illness.13 This latter understanding may seem credible since mental illness
challenges of mental health court research prevent these problem-solving courts
from rising to the level of an evidence-based practice.” See Honegger, supra, at 484.
As Michael O’Hear has observed in the context of drug courts, examining the
suitability of mental health courts as instruments of punishment is even more important to the extent that they may offer a questionable social service. See Michael
M. O’Hear, Drug Courts as Communicative Punishment, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST:
HAS IT A FUTURE? 237, 238 n.2 (Michael Tonry ed., 2012).
10. See Honegger, supra note 9, at 479–82.
11. See, e.g., Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with
Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV.
143, 157 (2003) (surveying twenty mental health courts in 2001 and finding that,
in at least 40% of reporting courts, duration of court supervision “significantly
exceed[ed] the possible length of incarceration or probation for the offense”); see
also Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental Health
Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 587, 592 (2005) (in explaining Brooklyn’s decision to restrict its mental health court to felonies and chronic misdemeanor offenders facing one-year jail sentences, reporting defense attorneys’ concerns that,
because “more than 90% of misdemeanants in Brooklyn serve less than 60 days in
jail . . . treatment mandates of at least 1 year and potential jail sentences of a year
or longer for program failure [ ] were disproportionately onerous for misdemeanor offenders facing such short jail sentences”); ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note
3, at 3–4 (noting that “some participants remain under court supervision for much
longer than if they had been adjudicated in a traditional court” and that “[i]t can
be unclear whether participation is always in their best interest”).
12. See, e.g., Michelle Andrews, Mental Health Courts Are Popular, but Effectiveness
Is Still Unproven, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Dec 29, 2015, 12:00 A.M.), http://
www.duluthnewstribune.com/features/3908672-mental-health-courts-are-populareffectiveness-still-unproven [https://perma.cc/4ZQY-5HYM] (“As for the individuals themselves, if they’re facing just a few weeks or months behind bars for conviction of a minor crime, they may balk at enrolling in a program that requires them
to return to court repeatedly for up to two years.” (quoting Dr. Fred Osher)).
13. See, e.g., Robert F. Schopp, Mental Health Courts: Competence, Responsibility,
and Proportionality, in PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS 163, 165–66 (Richard L. Wiener &
Eve M. Brank eds., 2013) (observing that, because “MHCs are generally designed
to address offenders whose crimes are ‘more a product of mental illness than of
criminality’ . . . they should be punished less severely than ordinary offenders who
commit similar offenses because they are less culpable than ordinary offenders”).
Scholars and policymakers have not offered a thorough explanation of whether
these courts should be more lenient than traditional courts or what leniency
should mean in this context (i.e., less incarceration time, a shorter period of supervision, or a less onerous punishment as measured by duration of sentence and its
inherent severity). See infra note 289 and accompanying text for discussion of studies of offenders’ perceptions of sanction severity.

688

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 685

is a common mitigating factor at sentencing.14 Moreover, the offenders
targeted by these specialized courts—those whose serious mental illness
was a causal factor in their crimes15—are particularly likely to have diminished culpability.16 Thus, leniency would appear consistent with retributive principles of justice. However, examination of sentence severity in
drug courts, the specialty courts on which mental health courts are
modeled,17 suggests that treatment courts may be more likely to issue harsher sentences than traditional courts.18 Despite the similarities between
14. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e) (2016) (listing mitigating factors for
first-degree murder as including acting while under “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance,” while “under the substantial domination of another person,” and
while “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”).
But see infra notes 283–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of how mental
illness may aggravate sentences.
15. See Perlin, supra note 7, at 10–11 & 11 n.41. The Erie County mental
health court targets offenders whose mental illness was a causal factor in their
criminal activity. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
16. See Schopp, supra note 13, at 168.
17. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 3, at 1.
18. See Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Long Term Effects of Participation in the Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: Results from an Experimental Study, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 67, 79 tbl. 1 (2006) (finding that treatment court participants were
incarcerated an average of 158.9 days (often for noncompliance), while control
group members were incarcerated an average of 156.9 days); Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: One-Year Results from a
Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 337, 350 & 351 tbl. 5 (2002) (finding
that treatment court participants received average probationary sentences of 745
days while the control group received probationary terms of 613 days, and finding
that treatment court participants received average suspended sentences of incarceration of 1,252 days while the control group received suspended sentences of
1,068 days); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender
About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 49, 62 &
62 n.145 (2000) (revealing that participants typically must plead guilty to the most
serious offense charged, consent to participation in a twelve- to eigh
teen-month drug treatment program, and agree to a suspended sentence of incarceration of two to six years—a sentence “far greater than most first-time drug sale
defendants could receive outside of the treatment court by plea-bargain”). Other
studies have also found evidence of more severe sentences for drug court participants, especially for those failing to graduate. See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL.,
CTR FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION:
POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS 269, 281 (2003), http://www.courtinnovation.
org/sites/default/files/drug_court_eval.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2TC-YWER]
(finding, in study of six drug courts in New York State that, while drug court participants were significantly less likely than control group members to be sentenced
to jail or prison on initial case, drug court failures were “significantly more likely
than comparison defendants to have received at least some incarceration time as
part of their sentence in five of six courts . . . [and that] failures had, on average,
longer total incarceration sentences than comparison defendants in all courts except [one]”); SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., URB. INST.: JUST. POL’Y CTR., THE MULTISITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION 8, 80 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/237112.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PXV-M3F4] (examining
two-year outcomes from twenty-three adult drug courts and six comparison sites
from eight states and finding that, “when isolating the sentence on the precipitat-

2017] MENTAL HEALTH COURTS

AND

SENTENCING DISPARITIES

689

drug and mental health courts,19 researchers have yet to offer a detailed
study of sentence severity in the latter context.20
Research on sentencing disparities between mental health and traditional criminal courts is crucial for several reasons. First, mental health
courts provide a separate system of justice for a historically stigmatized and
disadvantaged population, which continues to be subjected to horrible
abuses by the state.21 The lure of paternalism is great when it comes to
individuals with mental illnesses,22 but principles of equity, fairness, and
ing criminal case that led to drug court or comparison group membership[,] . . .
there was not a significant difference in the probability of a custodial sentence
(22% for both samples) or in its average length, and the raw data pointed to a
slightly higher average length among those in the drug court (97.2 vs. 76.7 days)”);
Eric L. Sevigny et al., Do Drug Courts Reduce the Use of Incarceration?: A Meta-Analysis,
41 J. CRIM. JUST. 416, 416 (2013) (finding that drug courts significantly reduced
incidences of incarceration on precipitating offenses but “did not significantly reduce the average amount of time offenders spent behind bars, suggesting that any
benefits realized from a lower incarceration rate are offset by the long sentences
imposed on participants when they fail the program”). For commentary on this
phenomenon, see Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783,
787–94 (2008); Michael M. O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice As a
Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 480–81 (2009); Alex Kreit,
The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving from a Criminal to a Civil
Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 322–23 (2010); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1479, 1551–61 (2004).
19. See, e.g., Merith Cosden et al., Evaluation of a Mental Health Treatment Court
with Assertive Community Treatment, 21 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 415, 419 (2003) (discussing
similarities between non-adversarial proceedings in mental health court model
and drug court model).
20. To date, one study has examined the outcomes of individuals who did not
complete a preadjudication mental health court. See Bradley Ray et al., What Happens to Mental Health Court Noncompleters?, 33 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 801, 801 (2015)
(finding that 63.7% of defendants’ charges were dismissed, 21.0% received probation, and 15.3% received sentences of incarceration).
21. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 523–24; Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A
Dialouge on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 512 (2005)
(argument by Stefan). For merely one instance of the recent abuse of individuals
with mental illness in the context of the criminal justice system, see Eyal Press,
Madness, NEW YORKER (May 2, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2016/05/02/the-torturing-of-mentally-ill-prisoners [https://perma.cc/JDN3V85H] (revealing torture of mentally ill inmates in mental health ward in Dade
Correctional Institution in Florida).
22. Liberty is most at risk when the justice system is motivated by paternalism.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” (footnote omitted)).
Importantly, this Author prefers the term “individual with mental illness” or
“individual with mental disorder.” However, for the sake of variety, at times the
Article will use “mentally ill” or “disordered” as adjectives to modify “individuals”
or “offenders.” In using these terms in this way, this Author in no way intends to
communicate that mental illness is a master status or defines those whom it affects.
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anti-discrimination dictate that these individuals not receive more severe
punishments than others of equal culpability simply because of their illnesses.23 A finding that mental health courts systematically subject mentally ill individuals to disproportionately harsh punishment would imperil
the legitimacy of the courts.
Second, accurate information on sentencing disparities is necessary to
assess one of the chief justifications of treatment courts: their function in
diverting individuals from jail and prison.24 Treatment courts may serve a
diversionary function if they offer probation to individuals otherwise destined for incarceration. However, offenders may not experience diversion
if entering treatment court subjects them to longer and more intensive
periods of supervision.25 Indeed, it is possible that mental health courts,
to facilitate treatment, could widen the criminal net by extending supervision over a broader swath of individuals than the traditional criminal justice system would otherwise have captured.26 Examining sentencing
23. See Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental Health Court
Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QLR 811, 841–42 (2004) (arguing that subjecting mentally ill defendant to greater surveillance and deprivations
of liberty because of his or her mental illness “raises significant equal protection
questions” and noting that longer duration of treatment in mental health courts
than supervision in traditional systems is particularly problematic because of lack
of adversarial and procedural protections in former context).
24. See, e.g., Matthew W. Epperson et al., Envisioning the Next Generation of Behavioral Health and Criminal Justice Interventions, 37 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 427, 428
(2014) (observing that post-booking diversion programs focus “primarily on diversion of non-dangerous offenders with SMI [serious mental illnesses] from jails and,
to a lesser extent, prisons to mental health treatment” and that “[m]ental health
courts are the most widely implemented form of post-booking diversion”); Jennifer
L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New
Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 112 (2011) (classifying
mental health courts as a “a specific form of jail diversion” that has “spread prolifically over recent years”). Importantly, this Article uses the term “diversion” to
mean diversion from a more intensive entanglement with the criminal justice system to a less intensive one—typically from jail or prison to an alternative to incarceration—as opposed to diversion from the criminal system altogether. For
reasons made clear by Professor Christine Scott-Hayward, it is important to keep
these two understandings distinct. See Christine Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal
Diversion: The Rise of Specialized Criminal Courts, BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1–2, 6–11
(forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2956021 [https://perma.cc/
5G73-R5FD].
25. See supra note 18 (discussing evidence of more severe sentences for drug
court participants, especially for those failing to graduate); infra notes 299 & 306
and accompanying text for discussion of possible consequences of intensive supervision and discussion of possible consequences of probation violation, respectively.
26. See, e.g., Stefan & Winick, supra note 21, at 518 (argument of Winick)
(“There is a risk that mental health courts, if they are seen as an effective means of
facilitating the treatment of people in the communities who cause problems as a
result of their untreated mental illness, may prompt the police to begin arresting
people with mental illness for offenses for which they would not previously have
been arrested.”); cf. Transcript of Telephone Interview with Hon. William R. Cunningham, Erie County, Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas (Dec. 22, 2016), at 9
(on file with author) (“[The mental health court casts a] wider net [than high
risk/high need cases] in the sense that you’ll have an offender that really has nui-
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differentials allows us to better compare treatment courts’ diversionary potential to that of other programs for individuals with mental illness.27
Finally, a nuanced understanding of likely sentencing differentials
contributes to conversations on how to improve the next generation of
mental health courts. To the extent that mental health courts appear to
impose disproportionately severe punishments on individuals convicted of
certain grades of offenses—such as misdemeanors—those offense categories should be excluded from these courts’ purview.28 Furthermore, evidence of a lack of candid communication about sentencing differentials
between defense counsel and defendants could support efforts to
strengthen the independence of defense counsel and to buttress the
knowing and voluntary nature of decisions to enter mental health court.29
This Article is the first to quantify sentencing disparities between
mental health and traditional courts. Using a case study approach, the
Article compares how Pennsylvania’s Erie County mental health court and
county criminal courts sentenced individuals who committed the same offenses and held the same average criminal history score. Mental health
court data consist of interviews with key mental health court participants,30 the court’s sentencing data from 2010 to 2014,31 and information
gleaned from court materials.32 Anticipated mental health court
sance charges in the sense that they may be acting out in public a little bit because
they’re off their meds, the police respond, and there is a scuffle with the police
and then there’s . . . the next thing you know they’re in jail. That’s a person that
we could help because we could get them stabilized so that they’re not in public
being disorderly or disruptive or profane or whatever.”). Numerous scholars have
discussed the net-widening potential of drug courts. See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 6,
at 632–34, 635 (discussing drug courts’ net-widening potential); Miller, supra note
18, at 1551–61 (assessing the diversionary claims and net-widening potential of
drug courts).
27. See Skeem et al., supra note 24, at 112 & 113 tbl. 1 (characterizing four
types of programs for offenders with mental illnesses derived from general criminal justice models).
28. See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich, The Past, Present, and Future of Mental Health
Courts, in PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS 147, 150 (Richard L. Wiener & Eve M. Brank
eds., 2013) (discussing recent expansion of mental health courts to felonies and
criticism of misdemeanor treatment courts); Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 11, at
154–55, 162 (arguing that mental health courts should be used only when defendants face significant carceral sentences and when part of broad reform of community mental health system).
29. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
30. In particular, I interviewed Judge William R. Cunningham and the following treatment team members: Dante Battles, the Treatment Court Coordinator
and Supervisor with the Erie County Adult Probation and Parole Department in
Erie County, Pennsylvania; Matthew Cullen, an Assistant District Attorney with the
Erie County District Attorney’s Office; and Patricia Kennedy, Chief Public Defender of Erie County.
31. I appreciate the generosity of Dante Battles who compiled and supplied
this information.
32. See Treatment Court: Perhaps Your Best Option, ERIE CTY. (2013) (copy on file
with author) (provided by Dante Battles of Erie County, Pennsylvania Adult Probation on March 3, 2016); Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, ERIE CTY. 3
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sentences are derived primarily from interview data; the accuracy of those
sentences is checked against actual sentencing data for twenty-eight of the
thirty-three individuals sentenced to the mental health court over this
five-year period.33 The analysis then uses county-wide sentencing data
from the same period, obtained from the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing, to compare the sentencing of mental health court participants to the sentencing of individuals with the same average criminal history score convicted of the same offenses in county criminal courts.34
Reflecting the mental health court’s practice of accepting both first-degree misdemeanants and felons of all grades, the Article analyzes a total of
twelve offenses spanning four offense grades.35 Mental health courts vary
widely in their eligibility criteria, procedures, and, presumably, sentencing
practices.36 However, this study’s findings raise questions that should be
asked of mental health courts—and all problem-solving courts—
generally.37
(Aug. 2014) (copy on file with author) (provided by Dante Battles of Erie County,
Pennsylvania Adult Probation on March 3, 2016). The Article also relied upon
past examinations of the Erie County Mental Health Court conducted by the
Mercyhurst College Civic Institute. See MARK BEARY & ART AMANN, MERCYHURST
CIVIC INST., ERIE COUNTY TREATMENT COURT: MENTAL HEALTH COURT STATUS REYEAR 2 (2004), http://www.civicinstitute.org/wordpress/wp-content/
PORT:
uploads/2014/01/ecmh04.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DEL-RN9M]; KRISTEN
BURILLO, MERCYHURST CIVIC INST., ERIE COUNTY TREATMENT COURT: MENTAL
HEALTH COURT STATUS REPORT: YEAR 5 (2007), http://www.civicinstitute.org/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ectc_dec07.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V7RJ-GTU2]; GEORGE FICKENWORTH & ART AMANN, MERCYHURST CIVIC INST., ERIE
COUNTY TREATMENT COURT YEAR 3: MENTAL HEALTH COURT STATUS REPORT 8
(2005), http://www.civicinstitute.org/ci/docs/ecmh05.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9ZNW-8XL2] (discussing diagnoses and treatment of participants); EMILY REITENBACH & ART AMANN, MERCYHURST CIVIC INST, ERIE COUNTY TREATMENT COURT
YEAR 1: MENTAL HEALTH COURT STATUS REPORT (2003), http://www.civicinstitute.
org/ci/docs/ecmh03.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7KE-HSJB].
33. See infra Part I.B & II.
34. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing this data set). These
were the most recent data available. Telephone Interview with Leigh Tinik, Research and Analysis Manager, Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (Oct. 17,
2016). Noting that 68% of mental health court participants from 2010 to 2014 had
a prior record score of 0, the analysis uses offense-specific county sentencing data
restricted to this criminal history score. See Appendix B; see also infra notes 273–80
and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent to which sentencing disparities may exist for those with deeper criminal histories.
35. See infra Part II.C. Lesser misdemeanors are also accepted, but this practice is apparently discouraged. See Appendix B; see also Telephone Interview with
Dante Battles, Erie County Treatment Court Coordinator (July 13, 2016), at 8
[hereinafter Battles Interview]. Mr. Battles explained that, in “rare cases . . . we
have people that have just say one or two offenses and their total maximum is four
years, . . . [but] usually [we’re] looking at least [at] misdemeanors of the first
degree which carry a maximum penalty of five years.” See Battles Interview, supra.
He explained that individuals with low prior record scores convicted of lower level
misdemeanors “usually they don’t end up in this program, [but instead] they end
up on regular supervision.” Id.
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part III.
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The findings are striking. First, the qualitative data show that treatment team members generally expect all mental health court participants
to receive sentences at the maximum length of supervision.38 The quantitative data demonstrate, however, that receiving a maximum sentence is
likely for misdemeanants but may be less likely for felons.39 Second, comparing anticipated mental health court sentences to those imposed by
county criminal courts reveals that anticipated treatment court
sentences—for all grades of offense—typically exceed county court
sentences by more than a year.40 Even for first-degree misdemeanors, the
anticipated mental health court sentence exceeds the length of all traditional dispositions for each offense by at least 1.5 years.41 Third, this comparison suggests that most misdemeanants sentenced to the mental health
court would receive probationary, not carceral, sentences in traditional
court.42 This conclusion appears to be somewhat less applicable to felons
sentenced by the mental health court, especially serious felons.43 Fourth,
mental health court participants in this dataset with multiple convictions
more often received consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences
than those sentenced by traditional court.44 Fifth, key mental health court
actors appear not to comprehend likely sentencing disparities, or the high
rate of participant failures, which suggests that these realities may not be
communicated to applicants.45
This Article consists of three parts. Part I describes the Erie County
mental health court, paying particular attention to eligibility criteria, plea
bargaining and sentencing practices, lengths and conditions of program
phases, incentives and sanctions, graduation rates, dispositional benefits of
graduation, and rates of probation revocation. Part II provides an empirical analysis of sentencing in the mental health and county criminal courts.
The analysis begins with an evaluation of consecutive sentencing patterns.
Next, the analysis compares anticipated and actual mental health court
sentences to the average sentences ordered for the same set of crimes by
Erie County criminal courts for offenders with similar criminal histories.
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. See id.
41. See Appendix A; Figure 4. The one exception—the average jail/probation
split sentence imposed on 18% of individuals convicted of terroristic threats—was
six months shorter than the anticipated mental health court term. See Appendix
A; Figure 4.
42. See Appendix A; Figure 4; see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part II.B.2. Importantly, this analysis neglects two of the most
likely sources of harsh treatment incurred by mental health court participants: the
use of jail as a sanction for program noncompliance and the activation or imposition of incarcerative sentences upon mental health court failure. See supra note 18;
infra notes 299, 306 & 307 and accompanying text. Because of these omissions,
this examination will understate—perhaps substantially—the severity of sanctions
actually experienced by mental health court participants.
44. See infra Part II.B.
45. See infra Part I.
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Part III considers issues arising from findings of sentencing and dispositional disparities and identifies areas for future research.
I. ERIE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT
Created in 2002, the Erie County mental health court provides supervision, services, and treatment as an alternative sentencing disposition for
certain mentally ill defendants charged with misdemeanors or felonies.46
Judge William R. Cunningham, who presides over the court, describes the
court as fundamentally a “behavior management program.”47 The mental
health court’s caseload fluctuates between roughly twelve and twenty-five
individuals.48 The court’s model “treats the severe mental illness as the
causative factor in the candidate’s criminal history” and “is based on the
philosophy of breaking the cycle of re-offending by untreated mentally ill
people.”49 Treatment team members seek to provide participants with
needed help while holding them “responsible for what they did or a portion of what they did.”50 Eligible applicants must have a diagnosis of a
46. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 4; Telephone Interview with Matthew Cullen, Assistant District Attorney Erie County, Pa. (May 23, 2016), at 3 [hereinafter
Cullen Interview 1] (estimating that “that at least a third if not most of our people
have a felony” and are ideal candidates in the sense that they “may be looking at
incarceration or state incarceration but . . . because of their mental illness that may
not be necessary or may not be the most effective way to deal with their case”);
Telephone Interview with Patricia Kennedy, Chief Public Defender, Erie County,
Pa. (May 24, 2016), at 5 [hereinafter Kennedy Interview] (“I think that the vast
majority of our mental health court clients were originally charged with felonies
that were either withdrawn or pleaded down to misdemeanors.”). The Erie
County Treatment Court consists of a mental health court and a drug treatment
court component. See What is Treatment Court, ERIE CTY. GOV’T, http://www.erie
countypa.gov/courts/treatment-courts.aspx [https://perma.cc/EUP7-BDUQ]
(last visited May 12, 2016).
47. See Telephone Interview with Hon. William R. Cunningham (Dec. 22,
2016), at 2 [hereinafter Cunningham Interview] (“[A]ny problem solving court is
really a behavior management program because it’s governed by a series of sanctions and incentives that you’re hoping to direct their behavior so that they get on
the path they need to be on and stay on that path.”); see also id. at 5 (“[T]he most
important component of their plan is what their mental health treatment is and
that they are following that.”).
48. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 4–5.
49. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 4; see also Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46,
at 2 (“[T]he purpose of the court is to treat the mental . . . illness[,] . . . stabilize
this person[,] . . . and then the criminal behavior will dissipate.”); Cunningham
Interview, supra note 47, at 3 (observing that, “if there is no correlation between
[individuals’ mental illness and their crimes] then there’s really no purpose in
having them in treatment court”). For a discussion of research suggesting the fallacy of assuming that mental illness drives criminal behavior, see Johnston, supra
note 1, at 558–75.
50. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 2. The Treatment Team consists
of Treatment Court Coordinator Dante Battles, Assistant District Attorney Matthew
Cullen, Chief Public Defender Patricia Kennedy, mental health and substance
abuse caseworkers and managers, and individuals from probation and various state
agencies. See Treatment Team, ERIE CTY. GOV’T, http://www.eriecountypa.gov/
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serious and persistent mental illness,51 and the circumstances of the instant offense or of past offenses must strongly indicate that mental illness
was a contributing factor in the offender’s behavior.52 The probation office assesses each applicant with a risk/needs assessment tool, and the
treatment team excludes individuals “posing a risk of harm in the community, including but not limited to physical violence and sexual offenses,” as
well as those “whose history demonstrates a strong likelihood of recidivism, an inability to abide by the requirements of community supervision[,] or who [are] not amenable to treatment.”53 No prior record score
is automatically disqualifying,54 but a defendant may be ineligible due to
prior firearms convictions, more than two prior felony convictions, a significant history of misdemeanor convictions, or when the instant offense
or any prior conviction (including a previous juvenile adjudication) concerns a violent felony.55 Dante Battles, a Supervisor with the Erie County
Adult Probation and Parole Department and the Erie County Treatment
Court Coordinator, observed that most mental health court participants
have lower criminal history scores and have committed less serious offenses than those accepted to the Erie County drug court, which targets
“high risk/high need” offenders.56
courts/treatment-courts/treatment-team.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ME7-5FFQ]
(last visited Aug. 12, 2017).
51. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 3. For
an explication of the diagnoses and treatment of past participants, see BURILLO,
supra note 32, at 5, 13 & 13 fig.13 (listing applicable Axis I and II diagnoses and
diagnoses and treatment of program participants); FICKENWORTH & AMANN, supra
note 32, at 8 & 8 figs.12–13 (discussing diagnoses and treatment of participants);
REITENBACH & AMANN, surpa note 32, at 8 (detailing program requirements including twice weekly urinalysis).
52. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 4; Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 2.
53. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 4.
Additional ineligible individuals include juveniles, nonresidents of Erie County,
prior graduates of the Treatment Court who are no longer under court supervision, and those who committed the instant offense while on probation or parole.
See id. at 4.
54. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 6–7.
55. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 4.
56. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 4 (indicating that most mental
health court participants have prior record scores of 0 or 1). Supervisor Battles
explained that, because the primary criterion for participation in the mental
health court is the individual’s severe mental illness, the court tends to accept less
serious offenses and individuals with “much lower” prior record scores than those
in the drug court, where accepting “high risk/high need” offenders is more of a
priority. See id. at 5; see also Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 8–9 (similar
observation). Correctional best practices suggest that high-risk/high-need offenders should be the primarily beneficiaries of resource-intensive criminal justice responses such as mental health courts. See, e.g., JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, RISKNEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR OFFENDER ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION, PUBLIC
SAFETY CANADA 11 (2007), https://cpoc.memberclicks.net/assets/Realignment/
risk_need_2007-06_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD6U-UGQT] (“The risk principle
speaks of who should be treated (the higher risk offender), the need principle
speaks to what should be treated (criminogenic needs) and the responsivity princi-
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A. Criminal Eligibility Criteria
Regardless of the seriousness of the instant offense, participation in
the Erie County mental health court is imposed as a condition of probation after the defendant pleads guilty.57 The court accepts a wide range of
misdemeanor and felony charges, ranging from driving violations to burglary and arson.58 Particularly common charges include retail theft, theft,
aggravated assault, simple assault, driving under the influence, disorderly
ple helps determine how to treat.” (emphasis omitted)); Kerry Meyer, Hennepin
County Criminal Mental Health Court: Experiences in a Large Metropolitan Mental Health
Court, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 485, 521 (2016) (“Problem-solving treatment
courts are the best way to supervise criminal defendants in the community who
present with high needs and a high risk to re-offend absent intervention.”); cf.
Mary Ann Campbell et al., Multidimensional Evaluation of a Mental Health Court: Adherence to the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model, 39 L. HUMAN BEHAV. 489, 495–500 (2015)
(finding that MHC case plans only moderately adhered to risk-need-responsivity
model and also finding small but significant improvements in criminogenic needs
of MHC completers relative to participants who were prematurely discharged or
referred but not admitted to program). For a discussion of the service principles
of the risk-need-responsivity model, see James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal
and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123
PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 125 (1998); D.A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future
of Risk and/or Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 10–11 (2006) (identifying
most powerful risk and need factors that drive criminal offending and should determine who receives treatment).
57. See Erie County Treatment Court Policies and Procedures, supra note 32; Cullen
Interview 1, supra note 46, at 5.
58. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 3–5 (discussing the court’s acceptance of various kinds of criminal offenses); id. at 6 (stating that burglary cases, but
not arson cases, have been accepted by mental health court in the recent past);
Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 2–3, 5 (discussing which cases are acceptable
to mental health court and consideration process); id. at 10 (noting that “we have
had some people in mental health court that have committed violent crimes such
as robbery and burglary”); supra note 46; infra note 59. Previous studies have catalogued the offenses accepted by the Erie County mental health court in the past.
See BEARY & AMANN, supra note 32, at 8 (reporting that charges included DUI,
theft, assault, burglary, disorderly conduct, child endangerment, terroristic threats,
arson, bad checks, harassment, defiant trespass, criminal attempt, resisting arrest,
and receiving stolen property); BURILLO, supra note 32, at 14 & 14 fig.14 (finding
that participants were charged with retail theft, theft, aggravated assault, driving
under the influence [DUI], criminal trespassing, resisting arrest, bad checks, burglary, disorderly conduct, driving violation, endangering the welfare of a child,
false reports, harassment, identity theft, illegal firearms, impersonating law enforcement, reckless endangerment, risking a catastrophe, possession of marijuana,
criminal mischief, simple assault, stalking, terroristic threats, unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle, drug violation with device); FICKENWORTH & AMANN, supra note 32,
at 9 fig.16 (finding participants were charged with theft, retail theft, DUI, assault,
simple assault, endangering a child, burglary, defiant trespass, arson, bad checks,
harassment, solvents, criminal attempt, habitual offender, receiving stolen property, firearms, sex crimes, corruption of minors, resisting arrest, and terroristic
threats); REITENBACH & AMANN, supra note 32, at 8 (“The type of offenses committed included DUI, burglary, disorderly conduct, child endangerment, harassment,
terroristic threats, and arson. Severe mental illness is the major causative factor in
committing the offenses for this population.”).
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conduct, and resisting arrest.59 The court’s data from 2010 through 2014
suggest that most participants fall into Level 2 of Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines, which call for county incarceration, restrictive intermediate punishment, or restorative sanctions such as probation.60
B. Standardized Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Process
Erie County has consolidated and standardized the plea bargaining
and sentencing processes for mental health court participants.61
1. Treatment Team Members’ Explanations of Plea Bargaining Process
When a defendant applies to the court, her application is sent to Assistant District Attorney Matthew Cullen.62 As ADA Cullen explained:
[A]ll of the applications for mental health court flow through
me. If it’s not a case that I’m specifically assigned to in my
caseload, I will pull the case from another attorney and usually,
pretty much like 99% of the time[,] . . . I will be the person from
our office that decides . . . [whether] we recommend this person
for . . . mental health court and what the plea offer is going to
be.63
ADA Cullen will negotiate the plea bargain with the public defender assigned to a particular defendant; the defense representation function is
not consolidated in one attorney.64
ADA Cullen does not view mental health court participation as punitive.65 Rather, he works to secure the term of supervision he deems appro59. See BEARY & AMANN, supra note 32, at 8; BURILLO, supra note 32, at 14 & 14
fig.14; FICKENWORTH & AMANN, supra note 32, at 4 fig.1; Cullen Interview 1, supra
note 46, at 3–4 (confirming that commonly accepted offenses include retail theft,
theft, aggravated assault, simple assault, driving under the influence, disorderly
conduct, and resisting arrest).
60. See 204 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303.16(a) (2016).
61. See Telephone Interview with Matthew Cullen, Assistant District Attorney,
Erie County, Pa. (May 24, 2016), at 4 [hereinafter Cullen Interview 2]. Judge Cunningham explained that utilizing the same ADA for all mental health court admittances carries many advantages, including uniformity in exercise of discretion,
consistency in plea bargains offered, familiarity with diagnoses and community resources, and consistent application of a compassionate mindset. See Cunningham
Interview, supra note 47, at 4.
62. See id. at 4.
63. Cullen Interview 2, supra note 61, at 5.
64. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 1–2 (explaining that “the individual public defenders who have at least established a rapport with the client . . .
from the preliminary hearing on through the formal arraignment” are in a better
position to secure favorable and fair plea bargains).
65. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 10 (“I try not to approach it so
much from a punitive standpoint of saying that okay this what they deserve as like
punishment for their crime . . . , but more like what do I think would best mitigate
the risk that they impose in terms of supervision.”); Cullen Interview 2, supra note
61, at 1 (“For mental health court, . . . the traditional sort of notions of punish-
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priate for the defendant’s risks and needs.66 Depending on the situation,
ADA Cullen generates the period of supervision either by “go[ing] with
the more serious charge or the one that gives this defendant more exposure” or by working with several alleged or possible charges.67 He explained, “[U]sually what we like to do is give [participants] enough time
that they can get through the program, graduate from the program and
still have some supervision after that.”68 Other treatment team members
expressed that periods of supervision are set to ensure that individuals
comply with treatment “for a significant amount of time to make sure that
they really do get to the point where they are stable and can more or less
function independently . . . .”69 For this reason, the treatment team
strongly prefers cases permitting at least four or five years of supervision.70
ment and that kind of stuff are sort of set aside and so I’m more focused on . . .
how much time are we looking for [supervision].”).
66. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 10 (“[M]y calculus is pretty much
in terms of time. How much time do I think this person needs to be given supervision based on their needs and their risks.”); Cullen Interview 2, supra note 61, at 3
(“I’m not really so concerned about what the charges are necessarily but more so
what’s the [statutory] maximum and how do we get to a period of probation that
we think is appropriate.”).
67. See Cullen Interview 2, supra note 61, at 2–3 (discussing several approaches for generating satisfactory term of exposure). Despite the importance of
the period of exposure, ADA Cullen suggested that he is as likely to agree to a
reduction in charges for mental health court participants as for other defendants
charged with similar offences, “potentially even more or so.” Cullen Interview 2,
supra note 61, at 1; see also id. at 1 (“If somebody is charged with a felony and they
don’t have a felony on their record or they don’t have any kind of record I will . . .
usually try to avoid giving a felony for a plea because obviously that can have a
pretty adverse effect on their ability to find work and other sorts of things.”).
While charge bargaining might not have been available to mental health court
participants in the past it is “not necessarily the case” that ADA Cullen will be less
likely to reduce the most serious charge to gain more sentencing exposure for a
mental health court participant. See id. at 2, 6. Indeed, Chief Public Defender
Kennedy emphasized that charge bargaining is common and expected. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 6 (agreeing that charge bargaining is common
practice and commenting: “I think in any case that comes to the courts in Erie
County they are always looking to try to bargain things away to get a plea. . . . We
don’t have a true diversion [whereby] you can successfully complete the program
and we’ll dismiss the case. So, as the attorneys we are always looking to try to get
the best bargain for our clients, especially when they are entering into this program.”); id. at 5 (“I think that the vast majority of our mental health court clients
were originally charged with felonies that were either withdrawn or pleaded down
to misdemeanors.”).
68. Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 9.
69. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 18; see also Cunningham Interview,
supra note 47, at 5 (“I try to design a sentence, especially in the mental health side,
that is reasonable in length but allows enough time to make sure that we can have
the resource in place to, as I always say, we need to get you on the path you need to
be on and stay on that path.”); Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 8 (“I think the
time that we have in mental health court is more designed for, let’s make sure they
complete the program and let’s make sure they are stable.”).
70. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 9 (“[U]sually I’m looking for four
years at the least . . . . So obviously the judge gives them the sentence, but I would
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2. Mental Health Court Judge’s Sentencing Process
Judge Cunningham, who has presided over the Erie County mental
health court since its inception,71 sentences all individuals admitted to the
court.72 When interviewed, Judge Cunningham explained that, in his
early years on the treatment court, he would regularly impose the maximum supervisory sentence permitted for each offense and order multiple
sentences to run consecutively.73 This practice often resulted in sentences
of thirty or forty years in length, which provided useful “flexibility” in responding to participants’ behavioral and treatment needs.74 Because
these terms of supervision dwarfed those that individuals would otherwise
have received, however, defendants became unwilling to participate in the
treatment court.75 As a result, Judge Cunningham reformed his sentencing practices and now tends to order sentences spanning only five to ten
years.76 To reach this supervision period, Judge Cunningham—at least
when confronted with individuals with single charges of conviction—will
typically order the maximum term of supervision for misdemeanors and,
give them a plea that would expose them for four years. If for some reason based
on the charges, if it was less than that then we would look for at least two years.”);
see also Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 8 (stating that “we’re usually looking [at]
at least misdemeanors of the first degree which carry a maximum penalty of five
years” and saying there may be “a handful” of cases which involved shorter probationary terms). If the supervision period is too short, an individual can “max out”
of supervision without having completed mental health court. See Cullen Interview
1, supra note 46, at 11.
71. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 1.
72. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 5.
73. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 5 (“When I first started doing
drug court I basically gave everybody a community based sentence but I gave them
the maximum amount of time available for every offense that they entered a plea
to, which resulted in a number of people having probationary periods of 30 and 40
years. . . . [A]nd my thought was, that just provides us the flexibility that if someone isn’t completing the program then . . . we can still have all our options available. Well over time I realized that that really was a disincentive for people, they
didn’t want to go into Treatment Court if they knew they were going to have to be
on probation for 30 or 40 years. . . . [S]o then when I realized that I needed to
modify that approach I did it. So now . . . I try to design a sentence, especially in
the mental health side, that is reasonable in length but allows enough time to
make sure that we can have the resource in place to, as I always say, we need to get
you on the path you need to be on and stay on that path.”).
74. See id.
75. See id. Treatment team members concurred that the decades of probation
that Judge Cunningham used to impose at sentencing were so “obviously abnormal” that they deterred mentally ill defendants from applying to the mental health
court. Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 12; Kennedy Interview, supra note 46,
at 20 (“[T]here are more members of the bar association here and even members
of this office who remember the inception of treatment courts when the judge was
giving people 50 years of probation, pretty good. Those people are still very hesitant to apply people to the program.”).
76. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 5 (stating that he crafts
sentences “to be about five years of supervision or if they have a lot of restitution
they owe it might be up to ten years, but you know I don’t go past ten years in most
cases”); id. at 7.
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depending on the offense and underlying conduct, third-degree felonies.77 Longer sentences may be warranted for defendants who present a
high risk to the public, commit serious crimes, have greater treatment
needs, or have steep restitution obligations.78 In reaching the desired supervision length, the judge may order multiple sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.79 Judge Cunningham characterized the exact
sentence for a given charge or set of charges as “almost just an academic
point because the original sentence is always going to be of a sufficient
amount of time that we can work with the person, and if they do get revoked, there is still going to be time . . . to work with them one way or the
other.”80
As sentences sometimes extend beyond the five- to ten-year range and
may be reached through a variety of methodologies,81 treatment team
members tend to assume for purposes of plea bargaining that the court
will sentence defendants to the longest supervision terms authorized by
Pennsylvania law.82 State statute permits probationary sentences of twenty
years for a first-degree felony, ten years for a second-degree felony, seven
years for a third-degree felony, five years for a misdemeanor of the first
degree, two years for a misdemeanor of the second degree, and one year
for a misdemeanor of the third degree.83 Though a defendant may ulti77. See id. at 13 (“Now if they have like a misdemeanor in the second degree,
which is a two year maximum, I’d have to give them that maximum sentence because otherwise we wouldn’t have enough time to work with the person.”); id.
(agreeing that, if individual was convicted of single first-degree misdemeanor, he
would sentence him or her to a five-year supervisory term); id. at 13–14 (explaining that whether he will impose the maximum supervisory term of seven years for a
single third-degree felony will depend upon the nature of the charge (particularly
whether it involves violence), the nature of the underlying conduct, and treatment
team members’ recommendations).
78. See id. at 6–7.
79. See id. at 6.
80. See id. at 14; see also infra Part I.G (Revocation of Probation).
81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
82. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 10 (“I can pretty much rely on
[the judge] giving [mental health court participants] the statutory maximum term
of supervision, and so that’s kind of how I’ll formulate a plea. Now sometimes
he’ll go below that but I guess I approach my plea offers assuming that he’s [going
to] give them the statutory maximum.”); Cullen Interview 2, supra note 61, at 4
(“So, if I give somebody a sentence that exposes them to six years maximum the
judge is probably going to give them that.”); see also Battles Interview, supra note
35, at 1 (agreeing that Judge Cunningham tends to sentence defendants accepted
into mental health court to maximum authorized terms of supervision); Kennedy
Interview, supra note 46, at 6–7 (explaining how, previously, person charged with
three third-degree felonies would receive twenty-one years of probation but now
would receive concurrent sentences such that he or she would serve only seven
years).
83. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2016) (sentencing for felonies); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1104 (2016) (sentencing for misdemeanors); see also Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 3 (commenting that the maximum sentence typically
“doesn’t really extend beyond . . . 10 or 15 years, but of course we still see the
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mately receive a shorter probationary term for a given offense, team members opined that defendants should be prepared to receive the maximum
sentence.84
Treatment team members differed in their expectations regarding
consecutive sentencing.85 Because the primary aim of the judge—like
that of the treatment team—is to impose supervision of a particular duration, the likelihood that an individual will receive a consecutive sentence
may vary by the number and severity of charges.86 According to Chief
Public Defender Patricia Kennedy, the probationary terms ordered by
Judge Cunningham typically exceed those imposed by some judges but
perhaps not those of others, particularly when restitution is at issue.87
3. Empirical Analysis of Mental Health Court Sentencing
An analysis of the court’s sentencing data from 2010 to 2014 reveals
that participants’ total periods of supervision varied between 2.5 and 17
years, with an average supervisory period of 7.42 years and a median of
6.91 years.88 Two of the 28 participants over this time period received
sentences exceeding ten years.89
Fifty percent (14/28) of persons sentenced to the mental health court
between 2010 and 2014 were convicted of a single offense per sentencing
proceeding.90 Analysis reveals that 57.1% (8/14) of single-offense participants received sentences of at least 97% of the maximum length of supervision.91 More specifically, 85.7% (6/7) of single-offense misdemeanants
felony one case where [the judge] may give a 20 year stamp on it”). Defendants
are aware of these periods of exposure: maximum sentences for each charge are
included in the standard plea sheet prepared by the District Attorney’s Office. See
Cullen Interview 2, supra note 61, at 6.
84. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 3 (observing that “maybe if someone had no prior criminal history but had a serious charge [the judge] might go
less than the maximum, but it depends on what the maximum is”); supra note 82
and accompanying text.
85. See Cullen Interview 2, supra note 61, at 5 (noting that Judge Cunningham’s typical sentencing pattern is to order consecutive sentences and that ADA
Cullen anticipates this sentencing practice in his plea bargains, although the judge
“has been giving more concurrent sentences lately . . . maybe [over] the last three
years”); Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 7 (noting Judge Cunningham’s current sentencing practice of ordering concurrent sentences).
86. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 2–3 (explaining that, when there
are multiple charges, Judge Cunningham tends to sentence defendant to maximum authorized term of supervision for most serious charge and, if that is a very
serious charge, then any additional charges would likely carry concurrent
sentences; however, if defendant pleads guilty to multiple low-grade offenses, then
judge might order sentences to run consecutively). But see infra Part II.B (analyzing patterns of consecutive sentencing in five years of mental health court data).
87. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 7–8.
88. See Appendix B.
89. See id. (showing sentences of eleven and seventeen years).
90. See Appendix B (showing that 14 of 28 participants were convicted of two
or more offenses per sentencing proceeding).
91. See id.
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received the maximum (or nearly maximum) permissible sentence, while
28.5% (2/7) of single-offense felons did.92
Fifty percent of persons sentenced to the mental health court over
this period were convicted of multiple offenses.93 Analysis shows that
71.4% (10/14) of multiple-offense participants received—for their most
serious offense—sentences of at least 97% of the maximum length of supervision.94 Specifically, 90.9% (10/11) of multiple-offense misdemeanants received at least 97% of the maximum sentence for their most serious
offense; contrarily, none of the multiple-offense felons did.95
Of those with multiple convictions, 92.9% (13/14) of mental health
court defendants received at least one consecutive sentence.96 For more
detail on consecutive and concurrent sentencing practices in the Erie
County mental health court—and how these practices compare to those in
Erie County criminal courts generally—see Part II.B.
C. Length and Conditions of Phases of Program
The Erie County mental health court program involves “intensive and
comprehensive supervision, case management, and treatment.”97 Participants are given an individualized treatment plan, must comply with treatment directives, and must report to the Treatment Court Probation
Officer and case manager at least twice a month.98 The mental health
court may require periods of inpatient treatment or transitional housing.99 Prior to graduation, the program consists of three phases with decreasing responsibilities.100 The goal of Phase I is the stabilization of
mental and physical health and the discontinuation of any drug use.101 In
92. See id.
93. See id. (showing that 14 of 28 participants were convicted of two or more
offenses per sentencing proceeding). On the other hand, 28.82% of individuals
with a PRS of 0 sentenced in Erie County criminal courts between 2010 and 2014
had multiple offenses of conviction (1235 out of 4285 sentenced defendants). See
PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, STATEWIDE SENTENCING DATA: 2010–14 (copy on file
with author).
94. See Appendix B.
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also infra Part II.B (analyzing patterns of consecutive sentencing
in mental health and traditional courts).
97. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 4.
98. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 4–5;
Treatment Court: Perhaps Your Best Option, supra note 32.
99. See Treatment Court: Perhaps Your Best Option, supra note 32; Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 8–9 (describing thirty-day and six-month residential treatment options for participants).
100. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 5;
Treatment Court: Perhaps Your Best Option, supra note 32.
101. See E-mail from E. Lea Johnston to Dante Battles, Erie County Treatment
Court Coordinator, (Aug. 12, 2016, 12:48 p.m. EST) (on file with author); see also
E-mail from Dante Battles, Erie County Treatment Court Coordinator, to E. Lea
Johnston (Aug. 12, 2016, at 01:07 p.m. EST) (on file with author) (stating that he
modified the phase descriptions “to be more accurate”).
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Phases II and III, participants aim to remain drug free and maintain
mental health stability.102 All three phases involve urinalysis two to three
times per week, individual and group therapy, attendance at a support
group, a needs assessment, and payment of court fees and fines.103 The
frequency of court hearings decreases from weekly in Phase I to every four
weeks in Phase III.104 The court may impose sanctions for
noncompliance.105
Graduates vary in their progression through the first three phases of
the Erie County mental health court.106 The treatment court policy and
procedures manual advises individuals that their progress through each
phase is “directly contingent upon the participant’s effort and investment
in recovery”107 but represents that participants typically complete these
phases in fifteen months.108 Interestingly, treatment team members estimated that the mental health court program takes “around two years” or
“a year and a half to two years” to complete.109 However, data from July
2013 through June 2016 show that graduates took between 14.8 months
and 19.4 months to complete Phases I through III.110 The average completion period was 16.4 months.111 Previous studies of the Erie County
mental health court by the Mercyhurst Civic Institute found an average
program length of 21.57 months for those who graduated between July
102. See E-mail from E. Lea Johnston to Dante Battles, supra note 101; E-mail
from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101.
103. See E-mail from E. Lea Johnston to Dante Battles, supra note 101; E-mail
from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101.
104. See E-mail from E. Lea Johnston to Dante Battles, supra note 101; E-mail
from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101.
105. See E-mail from E. Lea Johnston to Dante Battles, supra note 101; E-mail
from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101.
106. See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
107. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 8.
108. See id. at 8 (“Generally, it takes up to six months to complete Phase I; five
months to complete Phase II and four months to complete Phase III.”); see also id.
(“Because of the nature of recovery, it cannot be expected that a participant will
complete Treatment Court within twelve months.”).
109. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 7 (stating that “the average length
in the program is usually a couple of years, twenty-something months, maybe a
little more”); id. at 8 (characterizing the “time for [mental health court participants] to be in the program and to complete it” as “usually around two years”);
Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 7, 18 (estimating, “on average, a year and a
half to two years”); see also Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 9 (“[W]e’re looking
at about . . . a little over a year to like—a year and a half to two years on average of
somebody being able to complete the program. So anywhere from I guess sixteen
to you know, let’s say twenty months.”).
110. See E-mail from Dante Battles, Erie County Treatment Court Coordinator, to E. Lea Johnston (July 5, 2016, 04:06 p.m. EST) (on file with author) (reporting that the average program length was 457 days (15.0 months) for graduates
from July 2013 to June 2014, 451.3 days (14.8 months) for graduates from July
2014 to June 2015, and 589 days (19.4 months) for graduates from July 2015 to
June 2016).
111. See id.
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2006 through June 2007,112 and an average length of 36.3 months for
graduates and current participants assessed between March 2004 and February 2005.113 The court holds graduations twice a year, so, if a person
misses one graduation date, participation in the program is necessarily extended by a minimum of six months.114
After the successful completion of these three phases, each graduate
participates in an additional post-graduation phase, which may last for the
remainder of her sentence.115 Phase IV requires appearing quarterly for a
judicial status review hearing, monthly check-ins plus random field visits by
a probation officer, a reduced number of random drug tests, and compliance with recommended treatment conditions, including medication
compliance and attendance at all meetings and recommended therapy
sessions with mental health professionals.116 When describing the requirements of this phase, court materials publicize only the quarterly status review hearings and reduced number of random drug tests.117
Depending on the individual’s remaining sentence, Phase IV may last only
a few months.118 At most, it may last up to eighteen years.119
D. Incentives and Sanctions
The Erie County mental health court uses a variety of incentives and
sanctions to encourage program compliance. Rewards for “sober, responsible behavior” include applause, praise, tickets to a monthly drawing,
passport stamps, tickets to community events, decreased supervision or
community service hours, gift certificates or YMCA passes, and advancement to the next program phase.120 Treatment noncompliance, positive
drug tests, failure to meet supervision requirements, or other violations
may be met with a range of graduated sanctions. Sanctions include judi112. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 8 fig.3, 16 (finding that graduates spent
average of 21.57 months (656 days) in mental health court—with shortest duration
being 15.22 months (463 days) and longest being 37.84 months (1151 days)—
despite published court materials advertising an estimated maximum length of
fourteen months and a minimum length of twelve months).
113. See FICKENWORTH & AMANN, supra note 32, at 11 (finding average stay for
graduates and current participants of 36.3 months, “the shortest being 18 months,
and the longest at 63 months,” despite published court materials advertising estimated maximum length of fourteen months and minimum length of twelve
months).
114. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 19.
115. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 12.
116. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 17.
117. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 5.
118. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 9 (stating that minimum term of
supervision is two years). ADA Cullen prefers a minimum term of supervision of at
least four years. See id. at 9.
119. See id. at 12 (“[G]enerally I would say the maximum [term of supervision] we’re looking at now is usually around 15 years of supervision; 15-20 [years]
would be the maximum.”); see also Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 11 (similar).
120. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 7.
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cial admonishment in open court, assignment of an essay, increased treatment or supervision requirements, increased frequency of drug testing,
demotion to a prior phase of the program, community service, fines, electronic monitoring, intensive supervision, confinement in prison, and, ultimately, termination of the program.121
E. Graduation Rates
Recent graduation rates for the Erie County mental health court are
low. While studies from 2005 and 2007 found graduation rates of 55.6%
and 68.2%, respectively, recent graduation rates hover between 30.0% and
37.5%.122 Notably, in recent years pre-graduation revocation rates—the
rate at which participants are terminated from the program prior to graduation and have their probation revoked—have ranged between 22.7%
and 50.0%, commonly equaling or exceeding graduation rates.123 To
graduate, an individual must complete the first three phases of the program, achieve at least ninety consecutive days of sobriety, and be current
on fines and costs.124 A study of the court’s first year found that substance
abuse often accounts for noncompliance, with approximately 25% of offenders relapsing into drugs or alcohol during their time in the
program.125

121. See id.
122. See Table 1. No offenders graduated from the program in the first two
years of its existence. See BEARY & AMANN, supra note 32, at 4; REITENBACH &
AMANN, supra note 32, at 9.
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; Table 1.
124. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 9.
Prior to graduation, an individual also must write an essay describing her experience in treatment court and complete an exit survey. See id. at 9.
125. See REITENBACH & AMANN, supra note 32, at 9; see also Cullen Interview 1,
supra note 46, at 15–16 (agreeing that noncompliance often stems from dirty urine
tests); Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 11 (stating that violations typically
include drug relapse or mental decompensation).
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ERIE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT126

Mar. 2004–
Feb.
2005127

July 2006–
June
2007128

July 2013–
June 2014

July 2014–
June 2015

July 2015–
June 2016

Graduated (%, n)

55.6%
(10/18)

68.2%
(15/22)

37.5%
(3/8)

30.0%
(3/10)

37.5%
(3/8)

Revoked prior to
graduation (%,
n)129

44.4%
(8/18)

22.7%
(5/22)

50.0%
(4/8)

30.0%
(3/10)

37.5%
(3/8)

9.1%
(2/22)

12.5%
(1/8)

10.0%
(1/10)

Transfer to other
probation services
(%, n)
Transfer to another
problem-solving
court (%, n)

20.0%
(2/10)

Sentence expired
prior to program
completion (%, n)

10.0%
(1/10)

25.0%
(2/8)

Crucially, neither ADA Cullen nor Chief Public Defender Kennedy
was aware of the recent low graduation rates.130 The Chief Public Defender, while admitting a lack of knowledge of graduation rates, expressed
that she “find[s] the mental health court graduate rate to be fairly high”
and noted her belief that participants “really, really succeed.”131 As the
Chief Public’s Defender’s job as a member of the treatment team is to
“sell” the mental health court to potential applicants, this misinformed
and apparently inaccurate perception is troubling.132
126. See Email from Dante Battles, Erie County Treatment Court
Coordinator, to E. Lea Johnston (July 8, 2016, 03:36 p.m. EST) (on file with
author) (conveying outcomes for July 2013 through June 2016); Email from E. Lea
Johnston to E. Lea Johnston (July 8, 2016, 03:50 p.m. EST) (on file with author)
(documenting one correction to information conveyed by Supervisor Battles in
phone conversation).
127. See FICKENWORTH & AMANN, supra note 32, at 4 fig. 1.
128. See BURILLO, supra note 32, at 6.
129. Notably, these figures do not include revocations of probation that occur
after graduation. For an analysis of this variable in a different data set, see Table 2
(showing that—of Erie County mental health court participants sentenced
between 2010 and 2013—35.7% had their probation revoked prior to graduation,
while 10.7% had their probation revoked after graduation, for a total revocation
rate of 46.4%).
130. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 15; Kennedy Interview, supra
note 46, at 13.
131. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 13.
132. See id. at 1 (“I’m the resource and the officer in the office for the purpose of maybe selling mental health court to either the clients or to the victim at
the time of the preliminary hearing.”); id. at 11 (describing how she tries to “sell”
mental health court to defendants).
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F. Dispositional Benefits of Graduation
Successful graduation and satisfaction of probation conditions may
carry important dispositional benefits for mental health court participants.
Unlike other mental health courts that accept misdemeanors,133 the Erie
County court does not offer a dismissal of charges or expungement of
conviction at any point in the process.134 Court materials advertise two
possible dispositional benefits: reduction of sentence at graduation and
early discharge from supervision during the fourth phase of the program.135 Although the treatment brochure states that “[i]t is likely upon
graduation from Treatment Court that your remaining sentence will be
reduced,”136 ADA Cullen and Supervisor Battles report that such reductions are rare.137
133. See, e.g., Alachua County Mental Health Court, OFF. OF THE ST. ATT’Y,
EIGHTH JUD. CIR., http://www.sao8.org/mental.html [https://perma.cc/9AE8WGP2] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016) (“The defendant’s participation will end upon
the successful completion of the discharge plan. The charges will then be dismissed by the State Attorney or the violation of probation will be dismissed by the
Mental Health Court judge.”); Mental Health Diversion Program, TEMPE MUN. COURT,
http://nacmconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Tempe-MentalHealth-Court-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/L35T-AM7A] (last visited Aug. 22,
2017) (“If the defendant successfully completes the Mental Health Court Program,
he/she will receive a certificate of completion from the court and charges will be
dismissed.” (emphasis omitted)).
134. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 14.
135. See Treatment Court: Perhaps Your Best Option, supra note 32; Erie County
Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 9.
136. See Treatment Court: Perhaps Your Best Option, supra note 32; cf. Erie County
Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 9 (stating that “consideration
will be given to a reduction in the graduate’s remaining sentence” at graduation);
id. at 7 (listing “possible reduction of remaining sentence at graduation” and “possible early discharge from further supervision” as potential rewards for positive
behavior). Mental health court applicants also receive this message orally from
Judge Cunningham and members of the treatment team. See Cullen Interview 1,
supra note 46, at 13 (stating that he informs the defense attorney that the defendant “can earn an early discharge . . . if [he or she is] successful upon graduation”). According to ADA Cullen, Judge Cunningham communicates to a
defendant during sentencing language to this effect: “ ‘I realize I’m giving you a
pretty lengthy term of probation or supervision, but you need to understand that
you can earn an early discharge from the supervision if you graduate and are successful upon completion.’ ” Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 13. The Chief
Public Defender stated that defendants receive their sentences with “the promise
that, if you do well, it’s going to get cut anyway,” but conceded that this is not a
promise that is part of the plea offer. Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 11–12.
137. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 11 (agreeing that reduction in
sentence at graduation is “rare”); Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 13–14 (stating that mental health court participants have received reductions in remaining
sentences, typically of three to six months, upon graduation only “once or twice in
the last three years”); cf. Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 6 (“[W]hat we have
been doing upon graduation [the judge] will cut some of the sentence to kind of
reward them with some supervision in them. It’s usually a year or two depending
on how much time they have; it may be less than that.”).

708

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 685

Early discharge from probation—possibly as soon as a year after graduation—appears more likely than sentence reduction.138 Supervisor Battles explained that, every six months, the court reviews each remaining
graduate’s performance on supervision and whether she is current on
fines, costs, and restitution.139 Graduates in good standing are “very
likely” to receive an early discharge.140 Data for individuals sentenced
to the mental health court between 2010 and 2013 show that, of the
twenty-eight individuals who entered the program, ten graduated, six of
whom received early discharges.141 Thus, 60% of graduates ultimately received an early discharge of probation.
TABLE 2: ERIE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT PARTICIPANTS SENTENCED
BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 WHO GRADUATED, RECEIVED EARLY DISCHARGE
FROM PROBATION, AND WHOSE PROBATION WAS REVOKED142
Year of
No. of
Total No. of
Sentence Participants Graduates

2010
2011
2012
2013
Total
(%)

10
4
4
10
28

4
2
1
3
10
(35.7%)

Graduates
No.
Receiving
Early
Discharge
1
2
—
3
6
(21.4%)

No. with
Revoked
Probation
2
—
1
—
3
(10.7%)

No. of Non-Graduates
with Revoked
Probation143
3
—
1
6
10
(35.7%)
13 (46.4%)

Supervisor Battles opined that participants typically receive an early
discharge approximately two to three years after graduation, or roughly
four to five years after admission, regardless of their terms of supervision
or the severity of their offenses.144 However, the average sentence served
138. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 10 (“[G]enerally speaking
normally [a grant of early discharge would] have to be at least a year after
graduation.”).
139. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 6.
140. See id.
141. See Table 2.
142. See Email from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101, at 3
(conveying outcomes for individuals sentenced to mental health court between
2010 and 2014).
143. In addition, eight participants, not reported as graduates or revoked
non-graduates, either received an administrative discharge and were transferred to
another form of probation, are still on probation, were transferred to another
problem-solving court, or died. See Email from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston,
supra note 101, at 3 (conveying outcomes for individuals sentenced to mental
health court between 2010 and 2014).
144. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 7 (explaining that, for longer
terms of supervision, “the average length in the program [until graduation] is
usually a couple of years, twenty-something months, maybe a little more and . . .
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by the four individuals sentenced between 2010 and 2013 and who were
discharged early was only 27.5 months.145 These individuals had been
serving sentences of five to eleven years,146 so each secured release from
supervision upon serving between 17% and 50% of his or her total
sentence. The length of their sentences bore no relationship to the
severity of their offenses or the number of their convictions, while the
percentage of the total sentence they served tended to hold an inverse
relationship to both elements.147
These data should be viewed with caution as they only include four
data points. Supervisor Battles indicated that individuals with longer
sentences who struggle to pay their fines, costs, or restitution, who are
unstable, or who relapse into substance abuse may receive early discharges
after many more years have passed.148 He relayed an anecdote involving a
woman convicted in 2003 of first-degree arson who received a twenty-year
sentence in the mental health court and obtained an early discharge
twelve years later.149 This example underscores that individuals can
struggle to meet the conditions of Phase IV, participants are not entitled
to—and should not expect to—receive an early discharge within a certain
length of time after graduation, and the actual length of sentence served
varies widely.
someone gets discharged usually . . . two to three years after that . . . if they’re in
compliance”); id. at 8 (explaining that, for shorter terms of supervision, individuals
are typically discharged “about a couple of years” after they graduate).
145. See Email from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101, at 3
(conveying outcomes for individuals sentenced to mental health court between
2010 and 2014). Two additional graduates received early discharges from
probation, but it was impossible to calculate the actual sentences served by these
individuals due to a lack of information regarding date of sentence.
146. See Appendix B. One individual had a single charge; the other
individuals were convicted of multiple charges. Most serious charges of conviction
ranged from first-degree misdemeanors to ungraded and third-degree felonies.
For individuals with multiple offenses, Judge Cunningham ordered at least one
sentence to run consecutive to the first. See id.
147. See Email from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101, at 3
(conveying outcomes for individuals sentenced to mental health court between
2010 and 2014). Four Erie County mental health court participants sentenced
between 2010 and 2013 received early discharges. One participant serving a
carceral sentence of twenty-eight months for a first-degree misdemeanor received
an early discharge after serving 33.74% of her sentence; one participant serving a
twenty-three-month sentence of intermediate punishment and probation for a
third-degree felony, an ungraded felony, and a first-degree misdemeanor received
an early discharge after serving 17.42% of her sentence; one participant serving a
thirty-month sentence of intermediate punishment and restorative sanctions for a
first-degree misdemeanor received an early discharge after serving 50.00% of his
sentence; one participant with a twenty-nine-month sentence of intermediate
punishment, restorative sanctions, and probation for an ungraded felony and two
ungraded misdemeanors received an early discharge after serving 40.28% of his
sentence. An additional two participants received early discharges, but no data
were available regarding date of sentence.
148. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 9.
149. See id. at 9.
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G. Revocation of Probation
Evidence suggests that mental health court participants are much
more likely to fail than succeed in the program. While 21.4% of participants in the four-year sample ultimately graduated and received an early
discharge from probation, 46.4% failed to satisfy program conditions and
had their probation revoked.150 Most of these individuals experienced
the revocation prior to graduation.151 Twenty-three percent of revoked
individuals, however, were unable to complete Phase IV of the program
and were revoked after graduation.152
Dire consequences can follow unsuccessful termination from mental
health court.153 For the vast majority, termination results in probation
revocation and resentencing up to the statutory maximum for the offense
or offenses of conviction.154 Participants will not receive credit against
their maximum sentence for time spent in mental health court except for
any time spent under electronic monitoring.155 Individuals may—but may
not—receive credit for any ordered stay in an inpatient treatment facility.156 The sentencing guidelines do not apply to a resentencing upon
150. As conveyed in Table 2, six of twenty-eight individuals sentenced by the
mental health court between 2010 and 2013 received an early discharge, while
thirteen had their probation revoked before or after graduation. See Table 2.
151. Ten of thirteen revoked individuals received their revocations prior to
graduation. See Table 2.
152. Three of thirteen revoked individuals received their revocations after
graduation. See Table 2.
153. See Erie County Treatment Court Policy and Procedures, supra note 32, at 8 (“If
it becomes clear to the Treatment Team that a participant is not going to graduate, then the participant may be revoked from the program and resentenced. Alternatively, a participant need not be revoked but can simply be terminated from
the program and placed on standard supervision within the probation
department.”).
154. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 15; see also Pennsylvania v. Tann,
79 A.3d 1130, 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“[W]hen such a criminal defendant
violates the terms of his probation, he may be resentenced up to the statutory
maximum, regardless of the fact that the lesser sentence induced him to plead
guilty in the first place.”). But see infra note 159 and accompanying text regarding
Judge Cunningham’s attestation that he considers sentencing guidelines at
resentencings. Occasionally, individuals—typically those with intellectual disabilities or traumatic brain injury—may be terminated from mental health court and
moved to “field services” or standard supervision. See Cullen Interview 1, supra
note 46, at 15; Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 16; Table 1. These individuals
receive an administrative discharge. In addition, individuals may be transferred to
another problem-solving court, such as drug treatment court. See Table 1.
155. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 15 (“We call [time spent in mental
health court] ‘street time.’ They lose their street time usually. I don’t think I’ve
ever seen it granted.”); Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 14–16.
156. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 14–15; see also Pennsylvania v.
Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (stating that, “[g]enerally, it is
within the trial court’s discretion whether to credit time spent in an institutionalized rehabilitation and treatment program as time served ‘in custody’ ” and holding that Judge Cunningham did not err in denying drug court participant, whose

2017] MENTAL HEALTH COURTS

AND

SENTENCING DISPARITIES

711

probation revocation,157 and the resentencing will be unconstrained by
the terms of any previous plea agreement.158 However, Judge Cunningham reported that he considers the guidelines when resentencing.159
Although he offers the option to defendants to recuse himself because of his deep familiarity with each failed participant, Judge Cunningham typically resentences each individual upon probation revocation.160
Treatment team members report that nearly all revoked participants are
incarcerated.161 Judge Cunningham defends this disposition by explaining that, after a person has failed in mental health court, she has proven
that she is not amenable to rehabilitation.162 A revoked individual may
probation was ultimately revoked, time credit for time served in court-ordered inpatient treatment programs).
157. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.1(b) (2015).
158. See Pennsylvania v. Wallace, 870 A.2d 838, 843 (Pa. 2005).
159. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 12.
160. See id. at 10 (explaining that no revoked participant has taken him up on
his offer of recusal “[b]ecause I think they get a feeling like not only do I get to
know them but they get to know me that they find they trust that guy does really
know what my circumstances are”); see also Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 14
(explaining that Judge Cunningham will resentence individual upon revocation of
probation unless individual has accrued new charges); Cullen Interview 1, supra
note 46, at 16. The drug court literature suggests that, when the same judge oversees a defendant’s participation in treatment court and then resentences her upon
program failure, the judge may issue a harsher sentence as a result of being offended or as “double punishment.” See, e.g., Richard Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and
the “Healing Balm”: Drug Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 45, 69 (2010); Bowers, supra note 18, at 788; NAT’L
ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., AMERICA’S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL
COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 29 (2009); O’Hear, Rethinking
Drug Courts, supra note 18, at 481. An appellate court has reversed at least one of
Judge Cunningham’s sentences, imposed after a drug court participant’s probation was revoked, for excessiveness. See Pennsylvania v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735,
739–40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing defendant convicted of six felony drug offenses to two to six years of
imprisonment after his probation was revoked, but that court’s probationary sentence of thirty-six years was “manifestly excessive and constitutes too severe a
punishment”).
161. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 15 (averring that he is “99.9% sure
[that mental health court participants whose probation is revoked are] going to
get jail”); Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 16 (characterizing Judge Cunningham’s sentences upon probation revocation as “really fair” and noting that Judge
Cunningham “really respects the fact that people try and they work hard, and he
acknowledges improvements that . . . they make,” and so, when participants “put
forth that effort and the chips just don’t fall . . . and [participant ends] up getting
revoked, his sentence on revocation tends to be a county level sentence” of shorter
duration than Kennedy would otherwise expect). A judge may not impose a sentence of total incarceration unless certain conditions are met. See 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9771(c) (2017) (“The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant has been convicted of
another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that
he [or she] will commit another crime if he or she is not imprisoned; or (3) such a
sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.”).
162. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 12 (“I look at it [as] it’s a
failed opportunity at rehabilitation, so I’m not sure that we can give them commu-
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receive a sentence of imprisonment, as opposed to a shorter jail sentence,
if she originally committed a serious charge that provided for imprisonment or if she committed a new offense while under the mental health
court’s supervision.163
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL COURTS

THE

ERIE

This part uses Erie County criminal court sentencing data from 2010
to 2014 to compare the sentences imposed by the Erie County mental
health court to those sentences that individuals might have received if they
had remained in the mainstream justice system. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing provided the county-level data sets.164 Each data
set includes 313 fields of information, including demographic, sentencing,
and criminal history details for each individual sentenced in a given year.
Comparing treatment team members’ anticipated sentencing outcomes to county-level sentencing data demonstrates that, at the moment
of entry to the Erie County mental health court, defendants should typically expect to receive considerably longer sentences in the mental health
court than they would have received had they remained in the traditional
justice system.165 Because 67.9% (19/28) of Erie County mental health
court participants sentenced between 2010 and 2014 had a prior record
score of 0, this analysis compares the anticipated mental health court
sentences to county sentencing data limited to that prior record score.166
The analysis reveals that anticipated mental health court sentences often
extend years longer than traditional sentences.167 In addition, consecutive
and concurrent sentencing patterns show that participants in the mental
health court with multiple charges of conviction were 44.23% more likely
nity supervision anymore, although there are times where I will kind of go well
you’ve done enough jail time because you may have been detained for different
periods of time before you got revoked.”).
163. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 16 (agreeing that mental health
court participants who are revoked are “generally . . . looking at a state [prison]
sentence . . . , depending on the charges obviously,” but also noting that judges
have discretion in re-sentencing and “are pretty amenable to giving somebody a
county little sentence versus a state sentence if they’re revoked”); Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 16 (mentioning that those offenders who receive sentences
of imprisonment upon probation revocation typically would have received prison
sentences had they declined participation in mental health court altogether); see
also Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 15 (stating that revoked individuals usually
receive jail sentences, “especially if there’s no commission of any new offenses”).
164. Data may be requested from the Commission through an order form
available through this website: Request Sentencing Data Sets, PA. COMMISSION ON
SENT’G, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/data/request-and-obtain-data-reports-and-data-sets/
sentencing/data-sets [https://perma.cc/PB73-NW7N] (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
165. See infra Part III.C.
166. See Appendix B; supra note 56. For a discussion of how the variance in
actual PRS scores affects the significance of the article’s findings, see infra notes
274–80 and accompanying text.
167. See infra Part III.C.
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to receive at least one consecutive sentence than defendants in traditional
court.168 A higher likelihood of consecutive sentencing could compound
sentencing inequities. Finally, these data also suggest that the individuals
most often accepted to the mental health court are typically not avoiding
otherwise likely jail or prison sentences. Instead, the data suggest that the
sentencing exchange merely involves the participant’s receipt of a longer
term of supervision with much more intensive monitoring and participation requirements, presumably with increased support.169
A. Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Scheme
Sentencing courts in Pennsylvania have broad discretion to choose
the punishment most appropriate for a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.170 When selecting a disposition, a
sentencing court must consider “the protection of the public, the gravity
of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the
community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”171 It must order the minimum degree of confinement consistent with those objectives
and impose an individualized sentence.172 In addition, when selecting a
sentencing disposition and length, a judge must consult the sentencing
guidelines,173 which articulate a purpose of “provid[ing] sanctions proportionate to the severity of the crime and the severity of the offender’s
prior conviction record.”174
The vast majority of sentences imposed in Pennsylvania cohere with
the sentencing guidelines.175 As is generally the case in guideline
states,176 sentences under the guidelines are a function of the seriousness
168. See infra Part III.B.
169. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 11 (stressing that mental health
court offers possibility of ultimate self-reliance and flourishing and “support[ ] . . .
that they are not going to get on regular supervision”).
170. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(a) (2016) (listing seven sentencing alternatives); Pennsylvania v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
171. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b); Pennsylvania v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152,
157–58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
172. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b); Walls, 846 A.2d at 157–58.
173. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b).
174. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.11(a) (2016). While the guidelines “establish[ ] a
sentencing system with a primary focus on retribution,” its “recommendations allow for the fulfillment of other sentencing purposes including rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.” See id.
175. See PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2015), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annualreports/2014/view [https://perma.cc/Z9X7-JG2B] (“During 2014, 89% of the
100,317 sentences imposed, for which conformity could be determined, conformed to the guidelines. . . . Most (74%) were within the ‘standard’ range.”); see
also id. at 78 tbl.17 (showing that 79% of sentences in Erie County were within
standard guideline range, 11% were in aggravated range, and 6% were in mitigated range).
176. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1202 (2005).
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of an offense and a defendant’s prior criminal record. The Pennsylvania
Sentencing Guidelines assign to each offense an “offense gravity score”
(OGS), which ranges from 1 to 15.177 Each defendant’s criminal history
will be reflected in one of eight “prior record scores” (PRS).178 For each
combination of OGS and PRS, the guidelines provide standard, aggravated, and mitigated ranges in a Basic Sentencing Matrix.179 The matrix
groups these combinations into five levels that specify a particular, graduated set of authorized sanctions.180 The guidelines authorize more severe
sanctions—and carceral terms of longer durations—for offenders in
higher levels. Authorized sanctions may include, in increasing order of
perceived severity, restorative sanctions (such as probation), restrictive intermediate punishment (such as electronic home monitoring), county incarceration (jail), and state incarceration (prison).181 For jail and prison
sentences, the guidelines prescribe minimum and maximum terms of confinement.182 While the guidelines direct that the duration of any restrictive intermediate punishment should not exceed the range given for a
carceral sentence,183 Pennsylvania law permits terms of probation up to an
offense’s statutory maximum term of confinement.184 Participation in the
Erie County mental health court may be imposed either as a condition of
a probationary sentence or a county intermediate punishment.185
B. Disparities in Consecutive Sentencing
A defendant’s sentence will consist of two components: the sentence
(disposition and duration) ordered for each conviction and, if an individual has been convicted of multiple offenses, direction as to whether those
sentences will run concurrently or consecutively. Mental health court sen177. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.15 (assigning OGS to each criminal offense).
178. See id. § 303.4 (setting forth the eight prior record score categories of
“Repeat Violent Offender (REVOC), Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender
(RFEL), and point-based categories of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5”).
179. See id. § 303.16(a) (Basic Sentencing Matrix).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9763(a) (2016); 204 PA. CODE
§ 303.12(a)(4)(iv).
184. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9754(a).
185. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 5–6; Kennedy Interview, supra
note 46, at 13–14; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9804(a) (county intermediate punishment programs). State funding incentivizes mental health and other problemsolving courts to accept individuals eligible for restrictive intermediate punishments. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9806, 9808 (providing for establishment and
funding of county intermediate punishment programs). The Erie County mental
health court typically uses three or four months of electronic monitoring or time
served to fulfill the restrictive intermediate punishment portion of a county intermediate punishment sentence and then also imposes mental health court participation as a condition of the remaining probationary term. See Battles Interview,
supra note 35, at 5–6; Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 5–6.
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tencing data from 2010 to 2014 indicate that 50% (14/28) of participants
were convicted of multiple offenses.186
To the extent defendants weigh likely sentencing consequences when
selecting between participation in the mental health and traditional court,
they should consider the courts’ relative likelihood of ordering sentences
to run consecutively. Rather than provide guidance on consecutive and
concurrent sentencing, Pennsylvania law leaves the matter to judges’
broad discretion.187 Figure 1 conveys that 63.56% of defendants with multiple charges of conviction with a PRS of 0 sentenced in Erie County criminal courts between 2010 and 2014 received a consecutive sentence. In the
mental health court, on the other hand, 91.67% of similarly situated defendants received a consecutive sentence.188 According to Judge Cunningham and treatment team members, this tendency reflects a desire to
achieve a period of supervision sufficient to assure stability and independent functioning.189
Fig. 1: Percentage of Offenders with Multiple Charges
of Conviction, PRS of 0, and at Least One
Consecutive Sentence
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186. See Appendix B (showing that 14 of 28 participants were convicted of two
or more offenses per sentencing proceeding). On the other hand, 28.82% of individuals with a PRS of 0 sentenced in Erie County criminal courts between 2010 and
2014 had multiple offenses of conviction (1235 out of 4285 sentenced defendants). See PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, STATEWIDE SENTENCING DATA: 2010–14, supra
note 93.
187. Pennsylvania law does not provide guidance on when sentences should
be imposed consecutively. See Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing Guidelines in the
United States, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 4751 (E. Gerben
Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2246826
[https://perma.cc/6QEH-2RQD] (“Other jurisdictions, like Pennsylvania, do not
speak to multiple convictions at all and thus afford the judge nearly unfettered
discretion to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively. Then-Judge (now
U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Breyer criticized that discretionary model by observing that ‘[a] moment’s thought suggests, however, that this approach leaves the
prosecutor and the judge free to construct almost any sentence whatsoever.’ ”).
188. See Appendix B.
189. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 79, 85,
86 and accompanying text discussing consecutive sentencing.
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Patterns of consecutive sentencing for misdemeanants and felons are
revealing. As conveyed in Figures 2 and 3, in Erie County criminal courts,
60.1% (496/826) of misdemeanants with a PRS of 0 received at least one
consecutive sentence between 2010 and 2014, while 70.7% (289/409) of
offenders convicted of a felony received such treatment.190 Rates of
consecutive sentencing in the mental health court were significantly
higher for both categories of offenders. In the treatment court, 88.9% (8/
9) of misdemeanants with a PRS of 0 received at least one consecutive
sentence, while 100% (3/3) of those convicted of a felony did so.191
Fig. 2: Percentage of Misdemenants with
Multiple Charges of Conviction, PRS of 0,
and at Least One Consecutive Sentence

Fig. 3: Percentage of Felons with Multiple
Charges of Conviction, PRS of 0, and at
Least One Consecutive Sentence
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Sentencing data from the mental health court suggest that, regardless
of the number of offenses of conviction, the court will typically only order
two or three sentences to run consecutively in order to achieve its desired
supervisory length of roughly five to ten years.192 Three out of four
defendants with two charges of conviction received consecutive sentences.
All seven defendants with three charges of conviction received at least one
consecutive sentence; of this group, four received two consecutive
sentences.193 Both defendants with four charges of conviction received
190. See PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, STATEWIDE SENTENCING DATA: 2010–14,
supra note 93.
191. See Appendix B.
192. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text explaining that the total
periods of supervision of Erie County mental health court participants sentenced
between 2010 and 2014 varied between 2.5 and 17 years, with an average
supervisory period of 7.42 years and a median of 6.91 years.
193. See Appendix B. Please note that this Article treats offender JAB as
having one sentencing proceeding for three charges of conviction, as opposed to
two sentencing proceedings each for three charges of conviction. See infra note
319. This classification is necessitated by offender JAB’s identical docket numbers,
dates of sentence, and charges in the state coding system. JAB’s classification has
been confirmed by Supervisor Battles. See Email from Dante Battles, Erie County
Treatment Court Coordinator, to E. Lea Johnston (Jan. 19, 2017, 09:44 EST) (on
file with author).
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only one consecutive sentence. However, the sole defendant in the
sample with five charges of conviction received three consecutive
sentences.194
The significance of these observations is limited by the small sample
size from the mental health court. However, the data suggest that, for a
defendant charged with multiple offenses, the choice to enter the mental
health court may carry a heightened risk of consecutive sentencing. To
the extent this conclusion holds, differential likelihood of consecutive
sentencing could compound inequities between the two court systems.
C. Disparities in the Sentencing of Offenses
A comparison of sentencing in Erie County criminal and mental
health courts suggests that participants in the latter should generally expect to receive significantly longer sentences for a wide range of offenses.
This section analyzes the sentencing outcomes of twelve offenses ranging
from first-degree misdemeanors to first-degree felonies issued over a
five-year period.
Figures 4 through 7 convey, for particular offenses in each grade, anticipated mental health court sentences and the range of sentence dispositions imposed for each offense in Erie County criminal courts between
2010 and 2014.195 Depicted mental health court sentences reflect treatment team members’ expectations that the court sentences offenders to
the maximum supervisory terms permitted by statute.196 The discussion
following each graphical representation evaluates the extent to which actual sentencing data from the Erie County mental health court confirm or
conflict with these predictions. The criminal court sentencing data portrayed by the figures include mean maximum terms of incarceration in
county and state facilities, mean minimum terms of probation, and split
sentences consisting of both carceral and probationary terms.197 Appendix A portrays additional data, including mean minimum terms of incarceration, the composition of split sentences, coefficients of variation for
these figures, and the percentage of offenders who receive intermediate
194. See Appendix B.
195. See PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, STATEWIDE SENTENCING DATA: 2010–14,
supra note 93.
196. See supra notes 82–84 accompanying text; cf. supra note 76–79 and accompanying text regarding Judge Cunningham’s desire to impose sentences totaling five to ten years in length in typical cases.
197. Split sentencing figures denote the sum of mean maximum carceral
terms plus mean minimum terms of probation. State data document that prisoners tend to serve around 121% of their minimum sentences prior to release on
parole, and that jail inmates are often released on parole upon the expiration of
their minimum sentences. See SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: ANNUAL REPORT 2014,
supra note 175, at 26 (reporting release data for jail inmates); PA. COMMISSION ON
SENT’G, SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: ANNUAL REPORT 2013 25 (2013), http://
pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annual-reports/2013/view [https://
perma.cc/XR6H-FSAN] (reporting that this figure for prisoners has deviated only
by around four percentage points since 2001).
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punishments in county criminal courts.198 Appendix B details mental
health court participants’ sentencing data from 2010 to 2014.
Sentencing disparities are striking. For five common first-degree misdemeanors, the anticipated mental health court sentence exceeds the
length of all traditional dispositions for each offense by at least 1.5
years.199 Sentencing data confirm that most of these misdemeanants
would receive probationary, not carceral, sentences in traditional court.200
For felony offenses, the anticipated mental health court sentence also exceeds each average disposition ordered in traditional Erie County courts
by a period of years.201 For three common third-degree felonies, the anticipated mental health court sentence substantially exceeds—by nearly
two years—every sentencing option Erie County traditional courts typically
impose.202 Analysis of two second-degree felonies reveals that the anticipated mental health court sentence exceeds every average sentencing disposition by more than 4.5 years.203 With one exception,204 sentencing
data for two first-degree felonies show that the anticipated mental health
court term exceeds all average sentencing dispositions by more than ten
years.205 Data suggest that the mental health court may only reliably serve
a diversionary function for individuals convicted of the most serious
felonies.206
198. Intermediate punishments may include inpatient or outpatient treatment, house arrest with electronic monitoring, or partial confinement through
work release, a work camp, or a halfway facility. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9763(c)(2) (2016).
199. See Appendix A; infra Figure 4. The one exception—the average jail/
probation split sentence imposed on 18% of individuals convicted of terroristic
threats—was six months shorter than the anticipated mental health court term.
See Appendix A; Figure 4.
200. See Appendix A; Figure 4; see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
201. See infra Part III.C.2.
202. See Appendix A; infra Figure 5.
203. See Appendix A; infra Figure 6.
204. The remaining disposition—prison/probation split sentences imposed
on 19% of individuals convicted of robbery and consisting of an average maximum
prison sentence of ninety-eight months and mean minimum probationary terms of
120 months—was twenty-two months shorter than the anticipated supervisory term
in the mental health court. See infra Appendix A; Figure 7.
205. See Appendix A; infra Figure 7. But see supra notes 76–78; infra 231–35,
264 and accompanying text discussing Judge Cunningham’s preference not to impose sentences longer than ten years and how this sentencing policy would affect
sentencing disparities.
206. See infra Part III.C.2. Importantly, this analysis neglects two of the most
likely sources of harsh treatment incurred by mental health court participants: the
use of jail as a sanction for program noncompliance and the activation or imposition of incarcerative sentences upon mental health court failure. See supra note 18
and accompanying text; infra notes 299, 306, 307 and accompanying text. Because
of these omissions, this examination will understate—perhaps substantially—the
severity of sanctions actually experienced by mental health court participants.
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1. Misdemeanors
Misdemeanors were the most serious charge of conviction for 64.3%
(18/28) of individuals sentenced by the Erie County mental health court
between 2010 and 2014.207 These data reveal that mental health court
misdemeanants received sentences, on average, at 93.6% of the total permitted period of supervision.208
A comparison of county-level sentencing data for five common misdemeanors suggests that the mental health court imposes considerably
longer sentences—often twenty months longer—on misdemeanants than
such offenders would have received through traditional sentencing.
Moreover, for this grade of offense, the mental health court does not divert most individuals from an otherwise likely jail or prison sentence.
Rather, the court appears primarily to extend criminal justice supervision
over individuals with serious mental illnesses in order to induce treatment.
Interview data suggest that the Erie County mental health court
sentences individuals convicted of first-degree misdemeanors to five-year
terms of intensive supervision, the longest term Pennsylvania law permits
for this grade of offense.209 Actual sentencing data from the mental
health court from 2010 to 2014 confirm that most individuals convicted of
first-degree misdemeanors receive sentences of approximately five
years.210 On average, individuals convicted of this grade of offense received terms of supervision equivalent to 85.63% of the authorized limit,
or 51.4 months of supervision.211

207. See Appendix B.
208. See id.
209. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 8; supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
210. Thirty-three individuals were sentenced by the Erie County mental
health court between 2010 and 2014. See Email from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101 (conveying outcomes for individuals sentenced to mental
health court between 2010 and 2014). Sentencing data was available for
twenty-eight of these individuals. See Appendix B. Sentences for twenty-two firstdegree misdemeanors were included in this dataset. Fifteen of these sentences
included terms of supervision of approximately sixty months. See id. Considering
only individuals convicted of a misdemeanor as the most serious offense of conviction, fifteen of eighteen misdemeanants were sentenced at the maximum period of
supervision for their most serious charge. See id.
211. The average term of supervision imposed for the twenty-two first-degree
misdemeanors included in this dataset was 51.4 months of supervision, which is
equivalent to 85.63% of the authorized maximum term of supervision. See Appendix B.
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Fig. 4: Prevalence and Length of Sanctions for First-Degree Misdemeanors in
Erie Co. Mental Health and Criminal Courts
100%
60
50

Months

40

18%

Avg.
actual
length:
51.4 mo.

30

18%
12%

10

5%
5%

61%

20

5%

52%

9%

4%
2%

69%

11%

1%83%

78%
4%
9%

12%

0%
0
MHC all M-1s
n=22

Acc. Dev.
Fraud
n=33

Terr.
Threats
n=33

Theft unlawful
taking,
$200 - 2K
n=166

Theft receipt
stolen prop
n=80

Retail Theft
1st/2nd off
n=148

Erie Co. Criminal Courts
Prison

Jail

Jail/Probation

Probation

County data indicate that the five-year anticipated mental health
court term likely substantially exceeds the period of supervision an
individual would receive outside the mental health court.212 Analyzed
data include five common first-degree misdemeanors:213 terroristic
threats,214 retail theft involving a first or second offense of at least $150,215
access device fraud attempting or obtaining between $50 and $500,216
theft by an unlawful taking of between $200 and $2000,217 and theft by
receiving stolen property of between $200 and $2000.218 As conveyed in
Figure 4, with one exception, the anticipated sixty-month mental health
court sentence exceeds the average sentence length for all offenses by at
212. Most Erie County criminal sentences imposed for these offenses (for
offenders with PRS of 0) are also significantly shorter than the sentences actually
received by the twenty-two mental health court participants sentenced between
2010–2014. See Appendix B. Indeed, the average actual sentence imposed for a
first-degree misdemeanor on a mental health court participant—51.38 months (n
= 22)—substantially exceeds the length of every average sentence imposed for
each misdemeanor studied with the exception of one disposition received by a
minority of offenders with a PRS of 0 convicted of terroristic threats. See Appendix
B. Eighteen percent of these offenders received a split jail/probation sentence
with an average maximum jail sentence length of 13.9 months and an average
minimum probationary term of forty months, for a combined total of 53.9 months.
213. These offenses constitute some of the most common misdemeanors
within the Erie County criminal court system and appear to be commonly accepted
by the Erie County mental health court. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying
text.
214. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2706 (2016).
215. See id. § 3929(b)(1)(iii).
216. See id. § 4106(c)(1)(ii).
217. See id. § 3921.
218. See id. § 3925.
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least 1.5 years.219 The one disposition that cannot be so characterized—
the average jail/probation split sentence imposed on 18.2% of individuals
convicted of terroristic threats—was six months shorter than the
anticipated mental health court term.220
Importantly, the county criminal data suggest that most individuals
with a prior record score of 0 who are convicted of these first-degree
misdemeanors would otherwise receive probationary terms 50% shorter
than the anticipated mental health court term. For all five offenses
assessed, over 50% of defendants sentenced in Erie County criminal courts
between 2010 and 2014 received straight probationary terms ranging from
twenty-three to thirty-eight months.221 Indeed, regarding convictions for
four of five misdemeanors, between 60.6% and 83.1% of individuals
received probation with average minimum probationary terms shorter
than thirty months—2.5 years shorter than the anticipated mental health
court term.222 For these individuals, the mental health court may impose
a more onerous form of supervision—intensive supervision probation, as
opposed to supervision through the standard or mental health court
probation docket223—for twice as long a period as they would have
otherwise received.224
The data suggest that few misdemeanants would receive sentences of
incarceration if they remained in the traditional justice system. For each
misdemeanor surveyed, between 54.5% and 87.8% of offenders received a
non-carceral sentence of either probation or an intermediate
punishment.225 For the first-degree misdemeanors surveyed, between
8.8% and 36.4% received sentences that included a jail term.226 In
addition, a small percentage—between 2.0% and 12.1%—of defendants
received prison sentences.227 Thus, for most defendants with a prior
record score of 0 convicted of first-degree misdemeanors—which was both
the most popular offense accepted by the mental health court and the
most common most serious offense of conviction228—the Erie County
219. See Appendix A; supra Figure 4.
220. See Appendix A; supra Figure 4.
221. See Appendix A; supra Figure 4.
222. See Appendix A. The omitted offense is terroristic threats.
223. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 18.
224. The sentences imposed in traditional criminal courts are also
considerably shorter than those actually received by the individuals who were
convicted of first-degree misdemeanors in the mental health court. See supra note
211; Appendix A.
225. See Appendix A.
226. These figures include both straight jail and jail/probation split
sentences. See Appendix A; supra Figure 4.
227. See supra Figure 4 (showing that between 2 and 12% of first-degree
misdemeanants sentenced between 2010 and 2014 with PRS of 0 received prison
terms); id. (showing that, for three of five of these misdemeanors, 5% or fewer
misdemeanants received prison sentences). This dataset did not include any split
prison/probation sentences.
228. See Appendix B.
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mental health court does not appear to serve a diversionary function.
Rather, the court appears primarily to serve as a lever to coerce treatment
and extend government supervision over individuals with mental illness.
2. Felonies
Approximately 35.7% (10/28) of individuals sentenced in the Erie
County mental health court between 2010 and 2014 were convicted of felony offenses.229 A comparison of sentencing data for certain first-, second-, and third-degree felonies reveals that the mental health court
sentences anticipated by treatment team members exceed—and typically
drastically exceed—the length of corresponding sentences ordered by
Erie County criminal courts between 2010 and 2014. Indeed, in most instances, the anticipated mental health court sentence exceeds each average disposition county courts ordered by years. In addition, although
felony offenses are certainly more likely to be punished with incarcerative
sentences than misdemeanors, individuals convicted of third- and
second-degree felonies often are punished with non-carceral sentences in
the traditional justice system. For these offenders, the mental health court
may not be serving a diversionary function. Persons convicted of first-degree felonies, however, are much more likely to be incarcerated. To the
extent the mental health court opens its doors to these individuals, it may
offer a means to avoid otherwise near-certain incarceration.
Importantly, in accord with treatment team members’ expectations,
this analysis assumes individuals will receive the maximum sentences authorized by law.230 However, Judge Cunningham noted—at least in recent years—he typically orders five- to ten-year supervisory terms.231
Longer sentences, he explained, may be warranted for higher risk individuals and those who committed more serious offenses.232 These rationales
would presumably justify ten-year (or perhaps longer) sentences for those
convicted of serious felonies.233 Assuming the application of this logic, an
individual convicted of a single third-degree or second-degree felony
could receive the maximum term of supervision of seven or ten years, respectively.234 However, this logic suggests that a person convicted of a
first-degree felony may receive only half of the permitted twenty-year sentence.235 Similarly, individuals convicted of multiple felonies—were such
229. See id.
230. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
231. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 13 (stressing that “in the last
few years” he has not given maximum amount of supervision authorized for each
count consecutively); supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
235. See id.
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individuals accepted by the treatment court, an unlikely scenario236—
would either receive shorter supervisory terms or sentences that would run
concurrently.237 Unfortunately, the paucity of mental health court sentencing data involving felonies does not allow for rigorous testing of these
hypotheses.238
a. Third-Degree Felonies
Treatment team members expect that mental health court entrants
pleading guilty to third-degree felonies will receive supervisory sentences
at the maximum length of supervision, or seven years.239 Judge Cunningham explained that he might sentence an individual to the maximum supervisory term for certain third-degree felonies, such as assault or criminal
trespass pleaded down from residential burglary, but not for others, such
as repeat retail theft.240 Mental health court sentencing data from 2010 to
2014 only include four third-degree felonies. For these offenses, the court
sentenced two individuals to seven-year terms of supervision and two individuals to five-year sentences.241 The individuals sentenced at the maximum terms of supervision had extensive criminal histories,242 while those
who received five-year sentences had a PRS of 0.243
Figure 5 conveys that the anticipated mental health court sentence of
eighty-four months substantially exceeds—by nearly two years—every sentencing option Erie County criminal courts typically imposed for the three
third-degree felonies analyzed. This Article analyzes the three most common third-degree felonies the Erie County mental health court is likely to
236. See supra note 53 and accompanying text regarding public safety considerations; supra note 55 and accompanying text noting that an individual may be
excluded if she has “more than two prior felony convictions . . . or prior convictions . . . for [any] violent felon[ies].” Only one individual admitted to the mental
health court between 2010 and 2014 was convicted of multiple felonies, and she
had only one ungraded felony and one third-degree felony. See infra note 237.
237. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The limited sentencing data
involving mental health court participants convicted of multiple felonies does not
support the hypothesis that such individuals will receive concurrent sentences. In
particular, one mental health court participant was convicted of a third-degree
felony with a seven-year maximum sentence and an ungraded felony with a
three-year maximum sentence, as well as a first-degree misdemeanor with a fiveyear maximum sentence. See Appendix B. She received three-year sentences for
the ungraded felony and the first-degree misdemeanor and a five-year sentence for
the third-degree felony, all ordered to run consecutively for a total term of eleven
years.
238. See Appendix B.
239. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text regarding Judge Cunningham’s tendency to sentence offenders to maximum supervisory terms permitted by
statute.
240. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 13–14.
241. See Appendix B
242. These individuals had prior record scores of five and RFEL (repeat felony offender). See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
243. See Appendix B.
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accept: theft by an unlawful taking of movable property worth $2,000 to
$25,000 or a vehicle,244 criminal trespass of a building,245 and retail theft
involving a third or subsequent offense.246 The longest average disposition imposed by Erie County criminal courts, which was given to 12.3% of
individuals convicted of theft, was a jail/probation split sentence with a
mean maximum jail term of fifteen months and a mean minimum probationary sentence of 46.3 months.247 This sentence is nearly two years
shorter (22.7 months) than the anticipated mental health court sentence.248 All other dispositions are at least thirty-two months (2.7 years)
shorter than the anticipated mental health court term.249
Fig. 5: Prevalence and Length of Sanctions for Third-Degree Felonies in
Erie Co. Mental Health and Criminal Courts
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b. Second-Degree Felonies
The disparity between anticipated mental health court sentencing
and traditional sentencing was even greater for second-degree felonies.
Treatment team members expect that mental health court entrants pleading guilty to second-degree felonies will receive supervisory sentences at
the maximum length of supervision, or ten years.250 Only two mental
health court participants were convicted of second-degree felonies be244. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3921 (2016).
245. See id. § 3503(a)(1)(i).
246. See id. § 3929(b)(iv).
247. See Appendix A; supra Figure 5.
248. See Appendix A; supra Figure 5.
249. See Appendix A; supra Figure 5.
250. See Cullen Interview 1, supra note 46, at 12 (observing that maximum
sentences in mental health court typically do not extend beyond fifteen to twenty
years and explaining, “for example an aggravated assault, that’s a maximum Felony
2, it comes with a maximum of 10 years of incarceration so . . . that’s what the
judge may very well give them if they plead to that.”); supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text regarding Judge Cunningham’s tendency to sentence offenders
to the maximum supervisory terms permitted by statute.
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tween 2010 and 2014, so no firm conclusions can be drawn as to the accuracy of this prediction.251 County sentencing data for certain seconddegree felonies accepted by the Erie County mental health court252—burglary not of a home with no person present253 and criminal trespass involving breaking into a building254—reveal that every average sentencing
disposition ordered for these two offenses was more than 4.5 years shorter
than the anticipated mental health court sentence.255
Fig. 6: Prevalence and Length of Sanctions for Second-Degree Felonies in
Erie Co. Mental Health and Criminal Courts
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c. First-Degree Felonies
Sentencing data suggest that even greater disparities may exist for
first-degree felonies. Treatment team members appear to expect that
251. Only two individuals sentenced by the mental health court between 2010
and 2014 were convicted of second-degree felonies. One was convicted of burglary
not a home and no person present under title eighteen, section 3502(a)(4) of the
Pennsylvania consolidated statutes; the other was convicted of criminal trespass—
breaking into a building under title eighteen, section 3503(a)(10(ii)) of the Pennsylvania consolidated statutes. Both had a PRS of 0 and faced a maximum term of
supervision of 120 months. The burglar received a restrictive intermediate punishment of 3.16 months followed by a restorative sanction of probation for 56.86
months. The trespasser received a restrictive intermediate punishment of one
month followed by a restorative sanction of probation for fifty-nine months. Both
punishments constituted approximately 50% of the statutorily authorized maximum length of supervision under the statute. In addition, the second defendant
received a sixty-month sentence of probation for a first-degree misdemeanor that
was ordered to be served consecutively to the trespassing sentence.
252. See supra notes 58–59.
253. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(c)(2) (2012); id. § 3502(a)(4). Analyzed
sentencing data include sentences reported under either provision between 2010
and 2014 for “burglary—not a home/no person present” with an OGS of 5. See
infra Figure 7.
254. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).
255. See Appendix A; supra Figure 6.
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mental health court entrants pleading guilty to first-degree felonies will
receive supervisory sentences at the maximum length of supervision, or
twenty years.256 Actual sentencing data for mental health court participants convicted of first-degree felonies and sentenced between 2010 and
2014 were too meager to draw firm conclusions on the degree to which
practice matches prediction.257
Fig. 7: Prevalence and Length of Sanctions for First-Degree Felonies in
Erie Co. Mental Health and Criminal Courts
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Sentencing data from Erie County criminal courts for two offenses
accepted by the Erie County mental health court258—burglary of a home
with no person present259 and robbery involving threat of serious bodily
injury260—show that the twenty-year anticipated mental health court term
256. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text regarding Judge Cunningham’s tendency to sentence offenders to the maximum supervisory terms permitted by statute; infra note 257 and accompanying text.
257. Only one individual sentenced by the mental health court between
2010–2014 was convicted of a first-degree felony. This individual, who had a PRS
of 0, was convicted of burglary of a home with no person present under title 18,
section 3502(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania consolidated statutes. The statutory maximum for this offense was 240 months, and the standard guidelines range prescribed a minimum state or county carceral sentence—or, alternatively, a
restrictive intermediate punishment—of six-to-fourteen months. The mental
health court judge imposed a mitigated sentence of one month of restrictive intermediate punishment (likely served with electronic monitoring) paired with
fifty-nine months of probation as a restorative sanction. In addition, Supervisor
Battles also recounted the history of a women sentenced by the mental health
court in 2003 to 240 months of supervision for a first-degree felony arson. Battles
Interview, supra note 35, at 9.
258. See supra notes 58–59.
259. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(c)(1) (2016); id. § 3502(a)(2). Analyzed
sentencing data include sentences reported under either provision between 2010
and 2014 for “burglary—home, no one present” with an OGS of 7. See infra Figure
7.
260. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
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exceeds, with one exception,261 all average sentencing dispositions
imposed between 2010 to 2014 for these two offenses by more than ten
years.262 The remaining disposition—prison/probation split sentences
imposed on 19.0% of individuals convicted of robbery and consisting of an
average maximum prison sentence of ninety-eight months and mean
minimum probationary terms of 120 months—was twenty-two months
shorter than the anticipated supervisory term in the mental health
court.263
To the extent mental health court entrants convicted of felonies with
a prior record score of 0 do not receive sentences at the maximum
authorized term of supervision, these observations about likely sentencing
disparities obviously will not hold. Judge Cunningham stressed that he
typically does not impose sentences longer than ten years so as not to
disincentivize participation in the mental health court.264 In addition,
treatment team members noted that sometimes individuals—especially
those with low prior record scores—will not receive maximum
sentences,265 and actual sentencing data confirm this reality.266
d. Diversion
Finally, Erie County sentencing data suggest that, in many instances,
the mental health court is not diverting individuals convicted of third- or
second-degree felonies from otherwise likely incarcerative sentences.
Only a minority of the offenders convicted of the third-degree felonies of
theft by an unlawful taking of movable property worth $2,000 to $25,000
or a vehicle,267 criminal trespass of a building,268 and retail theft involving
a third or subsequent offense269 with a PRS of 0 received carceral
sentences between 2010 and 2014.270 Similarly, 58.3% of individuals convicted of second-degree criminal trespass in Erie County criminal courts
between 2010 and 2014 did not receive a carceral sentence, while 46.6% of
individuals convicted of second-degree felony burglary received a straight
261. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
262. See Appendix A; supra Figure 7.
263. See Appendix A.
264. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. This statement, however,
was not in reference to first-degree felonies.
265. See supra note 84.
266. See supra notes 241, 243, 251, 257 and accompanying text discussing few
actual sentencing data for felony offenders from Erie County mental health court
from 2010 to 2014.
267. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3921 (2016).
268. See id. § 3503(a)(1)(i).
269. See id. § 3929(b)(1)(iv).
270. See Appendix A; supra Figure 5 (showing that 44% of individuals convicted of theft, 48% of those convicted of retail theft, and 49% of those convicted
of criminal trespass received straight or split jail or prison sentences). Remaining
individuals received sentences of straight probation or intermediate punishment.

728

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 685

sentence of probation or a restrictive intermediate punishment and restorative sanctions.271
However, to the extent that the Erie County mental health court accepts individuals convicted of first-degree felonies—which appears to be a
rare occurrence—the court likely serves to divert these offenders from
otherwise probable prison or jail sentences. For example, 77.7% of individuals convicted of first-degree felony burglary within the sample period
received a prison or jail sentence, and 100% of individuals convicted of
robbery received a carceral sentence.272
D. Limitations
Limitations exist in this analysis of sentencing disparities between the
Erie County criminal and mental health courts. First, the Erie County
mental health court data set is very small, consisting only of twenty-eight
participants. However, these twenty-eight participants represent almost all
(84.8%) of the defendants processed through the mental health court
during the 2010- to 2014-time period. In addition, these data serve merely
to supplement and act as a partial check on the accuracy of treatment
team members’ beliefs, as expressed through their interviews, regarding
anticipated sentence length.
Second, the analysis compares anticipated mental health and county
court sentences given to individuals with a PRS of 0,273 but 32.1% (9/28)
of mental health court participants had a PRS of 1 or higher.274 In the
mainstream justice system, offenders with a higher PRS will tend to receive
longer and more severe sentences than those with a lower PRS,275 so the
sentencing differentials between the mental health and the traditional justice system will likely be narrower than those found in this Article.276
Although a detailed analysis of sentencing differentials for those with
a deeper criminal history is beyond the scope of this study, analysis of an
illustrative offense at a higher PRS is useful for illuminating the possible
extent of a sentencing discrepancy. Approximately 44.4% (4/9) of the
mental health court participants with a PRS higher than 0 had a PRS of 1,
all of whom were convicted of first-degree misdemeanors.277 The most
271. See Appendix A; supra Figure 6.
272. See Appendix A; supra Figure 7.
273. See supra note 34.
274. Specifically, 14.3% (4 of 28 participants) had a PRS of 1; 3.6% (1 participant) had a PRS of 2; 3.6% (1 participant) had a PRS of 3; 3.6% (1 participant)
had a PRS of 5; and 7.2% (2 participants) were repeat felons. See Appendix B.
Correctional best practices suggest that, in contrast to the practice of the Erie
County mental health court, problem-solving courts should focus their efforts on
high-risk/high-need offenders. See supra note 56.
275. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.16(a) (2016) (Basic Sentencing Matrix).
276. However, mental health court sentencing data from 2010 to 2014 suggest
that individuals with more extensive criminal histories are particularly likely to receive sentences at the full authorized term of supervision. See Appendix B.
277. See id.
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commonly occurring offense for offenders with a PRS of 1 was theft by an
unlawful taking of between $200 and $2000.278 Consistent with treatment
team interview testimony, the two mental health court participants with a
PRS of 1 convicted of this offense received five-year terms of supervision.279 Analysis of county court sentencing data suggests that, had these
individuals declined participation in the mental health court, they likely
would have received much shorter, non-carceral, supervisory terms. In
particular, between 2010 and 2014, 68.5% (37/54) of offenders convicted
of this offense with a PRS of 1 in Erie County criminal courts received
non-carceral sentences, with 55.6% (30/54) receiving probationary terms
averaging 30.1 months, or 50.2% of the authorized five-year sentence.
These sentences resemble those given to county criminal court defendants
convicted of the same offense with a PRS of 0: 78.9% (131/166) of these
individuals received non-carceral sentences, with 69.3% (115/166) receiving probationary terms averaging 28.3 months.280 This analysis of an exemplar suggests that the sentencing differentials found in this Article
will extend—though to a lesser degree—to those with a PRS of 1, the
second-most common criminal history score found in the Erie County
mental health court.
Third, the Erie County criminal court sentencing data include data
from the mental health court and the two other problem-solving courts in
the county.281 Problem-solving court data are unlikely to affect overall
averages too dramatically, however, as treatment courts serve only a small
fraction of defendants.
Fourth, one could argue that mental health court participants’ unifying characteristic—their serious and persistent mental illness—is relevant
to a number of sentencing factors,282 so the punishment of these individuals will likely deviate from “average” county sentences for the same offenses. This is a valid concern, but it is unclear how the trait cuts.283
Unfortunately, little research has examined how offenders’ mental health
status affects sentencing outcomes.284 Descriptive reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics published in 1999 and 2006 both found that state
prisoners with a mental health problem reported longer mean maximum
278. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3921 (2016); Appendix B.
279. See Appendix B.
280. See Appendix A; supra Part III.C.1.
281. See Treatment Courts, ERIE CTY., PA., http://www.eriecountypa.gov/
courts/treatment-courts.aspx [https://perma.cc/RWZ4-WLB2] (last visited Dec. 5,
2016).
282. See supra note 14.
283. See Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance
in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296–300 (1989) (explaining that, although mental illness itself is mitigating, it can often contribute to numerous aggravating factors).
284. See Megan L. Davidson & Jeffrey W. Rosky, Dangerousness or Diminished
Capacity? Exploring the Association of Gender and Mental Illness with Violent Offense Sentence Length, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 353, 355–58 (2015) (literature review).
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sentences than non-ill prisoners, while mentally ill jail inmates reported
shorter sentences than non-ill inmates.285 Differences in average criminal
history did not completely explain discrepancies in sentence length.286
Some research suggests that individuals with mental illnesses, especially
those who commit violent crimes, may tend to receive more severe
sentences because of higher perceived risk of future dangerousness.287
On the other hand, mental illness may serve as a mitigating factor to the
extent that it contributes to perceptions that an offender had a reduced
ability to understand the nature of her acts or their wrongfulness, had a
reduced ability to control her actions, had a diminished capacity to form
the necessary mens rea for a crime, is amenable to treatment, acted under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, or acted under duress.288
To the extent mental health court participants would tend to receive lower
than average sentences because of the mitigating effect of their illnesses,
the Erie County criminal court sentencing data may overestimate the sen285. See PAULA M. DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISSPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATION8 (1999), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf [https://
ERS
perma.cc/ZMY3-GXPJ] (“Overall, mentally ill State prison inmates were sentenced
to serve an average of 171 months in prison, or about 12 months longer than other
offenders . . . . Mentally ill jail inmates typically had sentences shorter than other
jail inmates. On average, mentally ill inmates had a maximum sentence of 20
months, while other inmates an average of 26 months.”); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN
E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 8 (2006), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZMY-X8GB]
(finding that state prisoners with a mental health problem reported mean maximum sentences that were, on average, five months longer than non-ill offenders
(146 months compared to 141 months) and that among jail inmates, mentally ill
offenders reported mean sentences that were five months shorter than non-ill offenders (40 months compared to 45 months)). These reports were primarily descriptive and did not include control variables.
286. Offenders who reported a mental health problem in both prison and jail
were more likely to have significant criminal history, more likely to be violent recidivists, and less likely to have no prior criminal history than offenders who did
not report a mental health problem. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 285, at 8 tbls.10
& 11; see also DITTON, supra note 285, at 4–5 (finding that mentally ill offenders
were more likely to be violent recidivists and report having three or more prior
sentences than non-ill offenders in both jail and prison).
287. See generally Leona Deborah Jochnowitz, How Capital Jurors Respond to Mitigating Evidence of Defendant’s Mental Illness, Retardation, and Situational Impairments:
An Analysis of the Legal and Social Science Literature, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 839 (2011)
(collecting and analyzing empirical literature regarding how capital jurors respond
to mitigating factors of mental health and cognitive and situational impairments).
Importantly, a recent study suggests that, at least in the context of offenders
charged with violent crimes, mental illness may function as an aggravating factor
for men but a mitigating factor for women. See Davidson & Rosky, supra note 284,
at 353 (analyzing national data from 2004 Survey of Inmates in State Correctional
Facilities and finding that “mental illness in the context of a violent conviction may
be interpreted as evidence of diminished capacity for females and future dangerousness for males”).
288. See, e.g., supra note 14 for list of mitigating factors included in 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711(e).
TICS
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tencing consequences they would face if they declined participation in the
mental health court.
Finally, Figures 4 through 7, while useful for showing descriptive differences in dispositions and sentence lengths, do not purport to portray
disparities in the overall severity or onerousness of sentences issued by the
Erie County mental health and criminal courts. Studies of offenders’ perceptions of sanction severity suggest that defendants may consider periods
of intensive supervision probation to be more onerous than a short jail
term.289 Social scientists concerned about the interchangeability of custodial and non-custodial sanctions have proposed a series of equivalency ratios for intensive supervision, regular probation, jail, and prison.290
Assuming that mental health court participation functions as a form of
intensive probation, these ratios could be used to compare the relative
onerousness of mental health court with conventional sanctions for each
of the twelve offenses analyzed in this Article.
III. AVENUES

FOR

FUTURE STUDY

The above analysis suggests that the terms of intensive probation imposed by the Erie County mental health court often dwarf those of the
traditional criminal justice system.291 Moreover, dispositional data reveal
that rates of probation revocation—and attendant resentencing for each
offense of conviction—far exceed rates of successful graduation and early
discharge.292 Yet information on graduation rates, rates of probation revocation, and sentencing differentials appears not to be clearly understood
by treatment team members,293 and thus is unlikely to be communicated
289. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, When Probation Becomes More Dreaded than Prison,
54 FED. PROB. 23, 24 (1990) (observing that about one-third of individuals eligible
for intensive supervision probation chose imprisonment rather than participation
in community supervision program); Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes,
Perceptions of Punishment: Inmates and Staff Rank the Severity of Prison Versus Intermediate Sanctions, 74 PRISON J. 306, 318 tbl.3, 322, 324 (1994) (finding that inmates
judged one year of intensive probation to be equivalent in severity to six months of
jail and three years of probation); Peter B. Wood & Harold G. Grasmick, Toward
the Development of Punishment Equivalencies: Male and Female Inmates Rate the Severity of
Alternative Sanctions Compared to Prison, 16 JUST. Q. 19, 28 tbl.2 (1999) (finding that
26.3% of inmates serving brief prison terms for nonviolent offenses refused to participate in any amount of intensive supervision probation to avoid four months in
prison, and nearly 19% of inmates refused to participate in any amount of intensive supervision probation to avoid a year of imprisonment). For explanations of
why offenders perceive some community sanctions as more onerous than imprisonment, see David C. May et al., The Lesser of Two Evils? A Qualitative Study of Offenders’ Preferences for Prison Compared to Alternatives, PROB. & PAROLE 71, 79 tbl.1 & 80
(2008); Wood & Grasmick, supra, at 30–31 & 31 tbl.4 (assessing 415 inmates’ reasons for preferring or avoiding participation in alternative sanctions).
290. See supra note 289.
291. See Part III.
292. See supra Table 2.
293. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 8 (voicing her opinion that,
“[o]n average[,] I think that [sentencing is] about the same now” inside and
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to individuals weighing whether to forego traditional sentencing in favor
of entry into the mental health court.
These findings suggest myriad avenues for future study. The Chief
Public Defender’s unsupported, rosy view of sentencing differentials and
the success rate of mental health court participants,294 for instance, suggests a possible tarnishing of the traditional adversarial role of defense
counsel295 and perhaps a greater allegiance to the mental health court
than to the individuals to whom she is “selling” the treatment court option.296 In addition, the longer terms of supervision and high rates of
probation revocation raise the specter that mental health courts are, especially for misdemeanants, non-diversionary and possibly net-widening.297
However, whether the mental health court, with its presumably greater
outside the mental health court); supra notes 127–28 (professing a lack of knowledge of current graduation rates).
294. See supra note 293.
295. See Steven Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts: Challenges,
Opportunities, and a Call for Caution, 42 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 335, 340
(2006) (observing that mental health courts “place defense attorneys in a potentially conflicting position between a traditional role of zealously advocating for
their clients and an emerging role of collaborating with the various members of
the mental health court to ensure treatment adherence” and that this dual role
may “marginaliz[e] the need for counsel to pursue the client’s ‘self-interest goals’ ”
(internal citations omitted)); Perlin, supra note 7, at 17–20; Allison D. Redlich et
al., Enrollment in Mental Health Courts: Voluntariness, Knowingness, and Adjudicative
Incompetence, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 91, 92 (2010) (“With therapeutic jurisprudence
at their base, MHCs have the potential to become paternalistic in nature. At its
extreme, an overly paternalistic court could either not present the choices or override the wishes of a potential client deemed to be too unstable to make the
‘proper’ decision to enroll.” (internal citations omitted)). This abdication of the
traditional role of counsel in the context of mental health cases is not new and
indeed is lamentably common in the civil commitment context. See Perlin, supra
note 7, at 17 n.71 (collecting sources); Michael L. Perlin, “Who Will Judge the Many
When the Game Is Through?”: Considering the Profound Differences Between Mental Health
Courts and “Traditional” Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts 1–8 (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860052 [https://
perma.cc/3QG7-SJTN].
296. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 1, 11 (describing how she tries to
“sell” mental health court to defendants). The Chief Public Defender’s misperceptions are unlikely to be corrected by the individual member of the public defender’s office assigned to the defendant. This attorney will likely view the Chief
Public Defender’s assertions as educated, given her years of experience on the
treatment team. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 46, at 1 (noting her involvement with mental health court since its inception). Even if not, the Chief Public
Defender’s position as the supervisor of the public defender’s office renders dissent and differential client counseling by her subordinates unlikely.
297. See supra Table 2 (showing that 46% of mental health court participants
sentenced between 2010 and 2013 experienced probation revocation, while only
21% successfully graduated and received early release); Part III.B. (differential
rates of consecutive sentencing); Part III.C (sentencing differentials between
mental health and traditional court); note 26 (discussing the possibility of netwidening).
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level of support and tolerance for minor technical violations,298 results in
greater probation revocation rates than standard or specialized probation
is an empirical question that merits further investigation.299
In addition, a lack of transparency regarding graduation rates, revocation rates, and sentencing differentials300—coupled with overly optimistic
characterizations of early release figures301 and average program

298. See Battles Interview, supra note 35, at 6–7 (stating: “[W]e don’t expect
people to be perfect. Sometimes there [are] minor technical violations, or you
could have someone who has had a relapse but has recovered from the relapse and
has responded well to you know additional treatment,” and explaining that these
individuals would still be eligible to stay in the program and even may even receive
an early discharge from supervision); Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at
10–11 (stating that “by the time they get revoked we’ve given them a couple of
chances” and noting that violations often involve relapses into substance abuse and
mental decompensation); supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Linhorst
& Dirks-Linhorst, supra note 9, at 24 (citing a study finding “that 21.1 % of mental
health court participants were arrested during supervision, of whom 33.7% were
still able to successfully complete the program, while another study reported that
23.2% of mental health court participants were arrested during supervision, of
whom 51.1% successfully completed the program” (citations omitted)).
299. Studies document that more intensive supervision increases the likelihood that an individual’s noncompliance will be discovered and punished. See
Phyllis Solomon et al., Predicting Incarceration of Clients of a Psychiatric Probation and
Parole Service, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 50, 53–55 (2002) (finding that intensive monitoring of probationers and parolees with mental illness was associated with substantially increased discovery and punishment of poor behavior); Redlich et al., supra
note 8, at 358–59 (detailing “growing literature indicating that offenders with
mental illness who are subject to intense supervision fare worse (in terms of returning to jail) as an artifact of the supervision”); see also ALMQUIST & DODD, supra
note 3, at 4 (observing that “the intensive supervision provided through mental
health courts may increase the chance of individuals being caught committing minor infractions, which could lead to additional charges and deeper involvement
with the criminal justice system”). Studies show that supervised individuals with
mental illness—because of their greater concentration of criminogenic risk factors
and parole officers’ greater scrutiny and lower thresholds for revocation—have
much higher rates of revocation than those without mental illness. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem et. al., Offenders with Mental Illness Have Criminogenic Needs, Too: Toward Recidivism Reduction, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 212, 217 (2014) (finding that
parolees with mental illnesses were 60% more likely to return to prison, largely
due to increased commission of technical violations, than those without mental
illness and explaining this finding by showing that offenders with mental illness
tend to have more general risk factors for recidivism); Jennifer L. Skeem & Jennifer Eno Louden, Toward Evidence-Based Practice for Probationers and Parolees Mandated to Mental Health Treatment, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 333, 334 (2006) (reviewing
existing research on failure rates of probationers and parolees with serious mental
illness and observing that “research consistently indicates that individuals with
mental illness are at double the risk of supervision failure” as individuals without
mental illness).
300. See supra note 293. These subjects are also not addressed in the court’s
brochure or policy and procedures manual.
301. See supra notes 136–37.
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length302—may lead to an uninformed entry303 and worse outcomes.304
This Article investigates variation in initial sentencing consequences; a full
assessment of the sentencing consequences of mental health and traditional court would require data on revocation rates attending parole, standard probation, and specialized probation,305 as well as resentencing
consequences for supervision failures.306 Finally, a full assessment of the
diversionary potential of the mental health court would also require assessment of the use of jail as a sanction to induce condition compliance,307
whether entry into the mental health court speeds or retards a detainee’s
release from jail prior to adjudication,308 and the extent that participation
302. The policy and procedures manual—which represents that participants
typically complete Phases I through III in fifteen months—appears to underestimate the time that participants typically take to graduate from the mental health
court. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
303. See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1996) (“A defense lawyer in
a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to
a charge appears to be desirable.” (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
EC 7-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992) (emphasis omitted)); Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note
11, at 154 (“If a guilty plea is required, a defendant should be given information
that would allow him or her to weigh the likely jail or prison time associated with a
conviction against the scope and duration of treatment that would be monitored
by a mental health court.”).
304. See Allison D. Redlich & Woojae Han, Examining the Links Between Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Mental Health Court Completion, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 109,
109 (2014) (demonstrating that not making knowing and voluntary mental health
court entry decisions leads to higher rates of new arrests, incarceration, and bench
warrants, which lead to lower graduation rates).
305. See supra note 299.
306. See supra notes 160–63; cf. Sevigny et al., supra note 18, at 416 (performing series of meta-analyses of various incarceration outcomes and finding that drug
courts significantly reduced incidence of incarceration on the precipitating offense but “did not significantly reduce the average amount of time offenders spent
behind bars, suggesting that any benefits realized from a lower incarceration rate
are offset by the long sentences imposed on participants when they fail the
program”).
307. See Cunningham Interview, supra note 47, at 8 (explaining that jail is
used as a “last resort” in mental health court). Mental health courts around the
country use jail as a sanction, at least infrequently, to induce condition compliance. See Redlich et al., supra note 8, at 355–56, 358 (finding, in their survey of
ninety mental health courts, that 92% of mental health courts were willing to jail
people for nonadherence, but that 33% estimated they placed noncompliant participants in jail in less than 5% of all cases); cf. Jaime S. King, Innovation in Second
Generation Mental Health Courts 241, 256–58, 265 (Oct. 14, 2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1284559 [https://perma.cc/KEW5-2K9H] (finding that the seven assessed mental health courts still used jail as sanction but that several had adapted
its use to minimize predictable decompensation of mentally ill individuals when
incarcerated, often without medication).
308. See Redlich et al., supra note 5, at 429–30 (comparing length of time
from arrest to enrollment into three mental health courts with that for arrest to
disposition for offenders with and without mental illness traditionally processed
and finding that diversion took about twice as long in comparison to traditional
processing of offenders with mental illness from the same jurisdictions); cf. Allison
D. Redlich et al., The Second Generation of Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL., PUB.,
POL’Y & L. 527, 535 (2005) (finding that time from referral to first mental health
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in the mental health court—for graduates and those who ultimately fail to
complete the program—tends to reduce future criminal justice involvement.309 All of these issues are important and merit further attention.

court appearance ranged from 0 to 129 days, with an average of 28 days across the
seven “second-generation” courts assessed).
309. See supra note 9. The benefits of decreased recidivism from mental
health court participation appear to be concentrated in graduates. See Campbell
et al., supra note 56, at 490 (collecting sources).
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Sample
Size

CoV

CoV
F-1
7
CoV
44.4%
(12.1, 32.4)
(.15, .23)

Prison/Prob.
Split
% prison split
sentence
(min, max)
Prob. term
19.0%
(49, 98)
(.23, .23)
120
0
4.4%
(13, 26)
(.08, .08)
90
0.33

AND

2014
FOR

Jail
% jail
sentence
(min,
max)
0.0%

Jail/Prob.
Split
% jail split
sentence
(min, max)
Prob. term
4.8%
(10, 23)
(0, 0)
24
0
15.6%
13.3%
(8.6, 20.1) (6, 16)
(.28, .18) (.32, .29)
42
0.25

ERIE COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS BETWEEN 2010
PRS OF ZERO

Other310
0.0%

WITH

13.3% 8.9%
70
0.54

Prob.
%
prob.
only
Prob.
term
0.0%

OFFENDERS
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310. “Other” dispositions include county and state restrictive intermediate punishments, which are typically paired with restorative sanctions. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
311. All term lengths are in months.
312. A Coefficient of Variation (CoV) is a tool for comparing degrees of variations when, as in this case, the means are drastically
different from each other. It is calculated as follows: (standard deviation)/(mean). The standard deviation is not indicated on this chart
because it has little comparative value given the drastically different means.

Burglary of home—no one
present; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
45
§ 3502(c)(1)*, (a)(2) (2016)

Robbery—threatens SBI; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3701(a)(1)(ii) (2016)

Charges

IN

Prison
% prison
Grade sentence
OGS
(min, max)
F-1
76.2%
10
(42, 111.6)311
312
CoV
(.36, .47)
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24

57

Criminal Trespass—
buildings—break in; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3503(a)(1)(ii)
(2016)

Theft by unlawful taking—
movable property (>$2k–
$25k/or veh.); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 3921* (2016)
4.0%
(1, 24)
(0, 0)

CoV
F-3
5
CoV
CoV
F-3
3
CoV

0.0%

0.0%

36.0%
34.5
0.66

50.9%
39.2
0.52

50.0%
46.3
0.66

16.0%

5.3%

8.3%

Prob.
% prob.
only
Prob.
term
Other
28.3%
18.3%
39.5
0.42
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CoV

8.8%
(7.4, 21.6)
(.16, .22)

CoV
F-2
4
CoV
0.0%

8.3%
(3, 60)
(0, 0)

Grade
OGS
F-2
5
CoV

Jail/Prob.
Split
% jail split
sentence
(min, max)
Prob. term
30.0%
(5.1, 15.7)
(.56, .4)
35.8
0.51
12.5%
20.8%
(4.7, 17)
(4, 16.2)
(.97, .46) (.96, .51)
48
0.32
22.8%
12.3%
(4.7, 18.8) (6.2, 15)
(.6, .28)
(.37, .39)
46.3
0.4
28.0%
16.0%
(1.4, 20.3) (2.8, 15.8)
(.81, .14) (.65, .27)
36
0.41
Jail
% jail
sentence
(min,
max)
13.3%
(6.4, 19.2)
(.16, .25)

AND

Retail theft—(3rd/subsq off);
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
25
3929(b)(iv) (2016)

60

Sample
Size

Burglary—not a home/no
person present; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 3502(a)(4), (c)(2)
(2016)

Charges

Prison/Prob.
Split
Prison
% prison split
% prison
sentence
sentence
(min, max)
(min, max) Prob. term
10.0%
0.0%
(8.7, 24)
(.34, .4)
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33

167

Access Device Fraud—
attempt/obtain $50 < $500;
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
4106(c)(1)(ii) (2016)

Theft—Unlawful Taking,
$200–$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 3921 (2016)
3.8%
(1, 36)
(0, .54)

CoV
M-1
3
CoV
CoV

4.8%
(1.6, 28.5)
(1.02, .42)

CoV
M-1
3
CoV

CoV
M-1
4
CoV

Grade
OGS
F-3
3
CoV

0.0%

0.0%

Jail/Prob.
Split
% jail split
sentence
(min, max)
Prob. term
21.3%
(3.3, 11.5)
(.92, .49)
23.7
0.4
0.0%
12.1%
(2.5, 8.3)
(.45, .47)
24
0.61
10.8%
5.4%
(1.5, 19.1) (2.1, 9.3)
(.97, .32) (1.25, .8)
27.6
0.42
3.8%
5.0%
(1, 15.2)
(1.2, 7.7)
(0, .62)
(.35, .55)
33.5
0.41
Jail
% jail
sentence
(min,
max)
21.3%
(2.6, 15.2)
(1.19, .55)

77.5%
23
0.5

69.3%
28.3
0.55

60.6%
24.6
0.61

10.0%

9.6%

15.2%

Prob.
% prob.
only
Prob.
term
Other
44.3%
6.6%
35.3
0.56
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Theft—Receiving Stolen
Property, $200–$2,000; 18 Pa. 80
Cons. Stat. § 3925 (2016)

61

Sample
Size

Criminal Trespass—
buildings; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 3503(a)(1)(i) (2016)

Charges

Prison/Prob.
Split
Prison
% prison split
% prison
sentence
sentence
(min, max)
(min, max) Prob. term
4.9%
1.6%
(1, 48)
(3, 12)
(0, .35)
(0, 0)
24
0
12.1%
0.0%
(3, 12)
(0, 0)
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33

Sample
Size

Retail Theft—1st/2nd offense
& $150 or more; 18 Pa. Cons. 148
Stat. § 3929(b)(iii) (2016)

Terroristic Threats; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 2706 (2016)

Charges

CoV
M-1
2
CoV

Jail/Prob.
Split
% jail split
sentence
(min, max)
Prob. term
18.2%
(3.7, 13.9)
(.56, .31)
40
0.22
8.8%
1.4%
(1.8, 10.5) (.4, 12)
(.55, .84) (0, 0)
12
0
Jail
% jail
sentence
(min,
max)
18.2%
(3.9, 19.7)
(.92, .32)

83.1%
24.3
0.63

4.7%

Prob.
% prob.
only
Prob.
term
Other
51.5%
3.0%
38
0.43

AND

CoV

2.0%
(13.7, 32)
(.57, .35)

Grade
OGS
M-1
3
CoV

0.0%

Prison/Prob.
Split
Prison
% prison split
% prison
sentence
sentence
(min, max)
(min, max) Prob. term
9.1%
0.0%
(7.3, 36)
(.26, .27)

2017] MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
SENTENCING DISPARITIES
739

740

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 685

APPENDIX B: DATA ON ERIE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT
PARTICIPANTS SENTENCED BETWEEN 2010 AND 2014313
Year of
Grade; Offense Label;
315
Sentence/
Statutory Citation
Offender
314
ID
2014/
M-1; Retail theft - take
NLW
merchandise (1st/2nd off &
>=$150); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3929(a)(1)
2014/
M-1; Terroristic Threats; 18
DAP
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706
2014/
DAP
2014/
CLD

2014/
AJD
2014/
CXB

316

317

OGS

1

2

INC = 1–23 mo.
PROB = 36 mo.
min., consec.

0

3

M-2; Recklessly Endangering 0
Another Person; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2705
2
M-1; Terroristic Threats—
intent to terrorize; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1)

3

IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 47 mo. min
PROB = 24 mo.
min., concur.

M-2; Recklessly Endangering 0
Another Person; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2705
0
F-2; Burglary—not a
home/no person present; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(a)(4)

3

3

5

Disposition

318

PRS

INC = 6–23.49
mo.
PROB = 24 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 24 mo.
min.
IP = 3.16 mo.
min.
RS = 56.86 mo.
min.

313. See Email from Dante Battles to E. Lea Johnston, supra note 101
(conveying outcomes for individuals sentenced to the mental health court between
2010 and 2014); STATEWIDE SENTENCING DATA: 2010–14, supra note 93.
314. Offender identification is represented by the offender’s first, middle
(where available), and last initials.
315. Grade definitions are defined as follows: F-1 for first-degree felony; F-2
for second-degree felony; F-3 for third-degree felony; F for ungraded felony; M-1
for first-degree misdemeanor; M-2 for second-degree misdemeanor; M-3 for thirddegree misdemeanor; M for ungraded misdemeanor.
316. See supra note 178 (defining PRS levels); see also 204 PA. CODE
§ 303.4(a)(2) (2016) (“Offenders who have previous convictions or adjudications
for Felony 1 and/or Felony 2 offenses which total 6 or more in the prior record,
and who do not fall within the Repeat Violent Offender Category, shall be classified in the repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender Category.”).
317. See supra note 177 and accompanying text for definition of OGS levels.
318. Disposition acronym definitions include INC for county incarceration,
IP for intermediate punishment, PROB for probation, and RS for restorative
sanction.
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Grade; Offense Label;
Year of
Statutory Citation
Sentence/
Offender
ID
2013/
F; Acquisition of Controlled
CXF
Substance by Fraud: Narc. Rx
Pills Sch. II (Oxycontin, etc)
(1-20 pills); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 780-113(12)
2013/
F-1; Burglary - home/no
WTM
person present; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 3502(a)(2)
2013/
M-1; Theft - Unlawful Taking;
TRD
$200–$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons
Stat. § 3921
2013/
M-1; Retail Theft—1st/2nd
TRD
offense & $150 or more; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3929(b)(iii)
2013/
M-1; Terroristic Threats; 18
MDD
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706

2013/
MDD
2013/
ADD

2013/
NLM

2013/
NLM

2013/
NLM
2013/
MNT

PRS

OGS

741

Disposition

RFEL 6

IP = 1.48 mo.
min.
RS = 118.53 mo.
min.

0

7

0

3

IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 59 mo. min.
INC = 1 - 23 mo.

0

2

PROB = 60 mo.
min., consec.

1

3

M-3; Criminal Mischief - over 1
$500; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3304(b)
M-1; Theft - Unlawful Taking; 1
$200–$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons
Stat. § 3921

1

INC = 6 - 23.49
mo.
PROB = 36 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.

F-3; Unlawful Device-Making
Equip. - produce or traffic in
equip.; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
4106.1(a)(1)
F; Acquisition of Controlled
Substance by Fraud: Schedule
IV; 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780113(12)
M-1; Bad Checks; $1,000 <
$75,000; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
4105(c)(1)(iv)
F-3; Retail Theft—
3rd/subsequent offense; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3929(b)(iv)

3

IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 59.03 mo.
min.
IP = 1.48 mo.
min.
RS = 58.53 mo.
min.
PROB = 36 mo.
min., consec.

0

6

0

5

0

3

PROB = 36 mo.
min., consec.

5

3

IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 83 mo. min.

742
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Grade; Offense Label;
Year of
Statutory Citation
Sentence/
Offender
ID
2013/
M-1; Access Device
SLK
Fraud - unauthorized use of
device ($50 < $500); 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 4106 (a)(1)(ii)
2013/
M-3; Theft - Deception; < $50;
SLK
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3922
2013/
M-3; Theft—Unlawful
SLK
Taking; < $50; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 3921
2013/
M-3; Theft by unlaw. taking SLK
movable property (< $50/no
threat); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3921(a)
2013/
M-2; Retail Theft—2nd
BSC
offense & < $150; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3929(b)(ii)
2013/
M-1; Theft by unlaw. taking—
BSC
movable property ($200–
$2,000/no threat); 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3929(a)
2013/
M; DUI—controlled
NAW
substances: Sched I (1st off);
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3802(d)(1)(i)
2013/
M-2; Resisting Arrest, etc.; 18
NAW
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104
2013/
M-2; Resisting Arrest, etc.; 18
NAW
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104
2013/
M-2; Resisting Arrest, etc.; 18
NAW
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104
2012/
F-2; Criminal Trespass—
EMB
buildings—break-in; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3503(a)(1)(ii)
2012/
M-1; Theft—Unlawful
EMB
Taking; $200–$2,000; 18 Pa.
Cons Stat. § 3921
2012/
F; Acquisition of Controlled
SNG
Substance by Fraud: Schedule
I, II; 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780113(12)

PRS
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OGS

Disposition

0

4

IP = 1.97 mo.
min. RS = 58.03
mo. min.

0

1

0

1

PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., concur.

0

1

PROB = 12 mo.
min., concur.

0

2

INC = 0.33 23.49 mo.

0

3

PROB = 18 mo.
min.

0

1

INC = 0.10 - 6
mo.

0

2

0

2

0

2

0

4

0

3

PROB = 24 mo.
min., concur.
PROB = 24 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 24 mo.
min., concur.
IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 59 mo. min.
PROB = 60 mo.
min., consec.

0

5

IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
PROB = 59 mo.
min., consec.
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Year of
Sentence/
Offender
ID
2012/
RKL
2012/
RKL
2012/
RKL
2012/
319
JAB

2012/
JAB
2012/
JAB
2012/
JAB

2012/
JAB
2012/
JAB
2011/
NJL

2011/
MJB

2011/
MJB
2011/
MJB

AND

Grade; Offense Label;
Statutory Citation

SENTENCING DISPARITIES
PRS

OGS

M-2; Simple Assault; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 2701(b)
M-2; Recklessly Endangering
Another Person; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2705
M-3; Disorderly Conduct; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(b)
M; DUI: Controlled
Substances—1st offense; 75
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(d)

0

3

0

3

0

1

0

1

M; Simple Possession; 35 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 780–113(16)
M; Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia; 35 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 780–113(32)
M; DUI: Controlled
Substances—1st offense; 75
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(d)

0

3

0

1

0

1

M; Simple Possession; 35 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 780–113(16)
M; Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia; 35 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 780–113(32)
M-1; DUI: Highest Rate of
Alcohol—(BAC .16+)—2nd
offense; § 75 Pa. Cons. Stat.
3802(c)
F; Possession w/ Intent to
Deliv.: Marijuana (1–<
10lbs.); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
780–113(30)
M; Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia; 35 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 780–113(32)
M; Simple Possession; 35 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 780-113(16)

0

3

0

1

0

5

0

5

0

1

0

3

743

Disposition

INC = 1 - 23.49
mo.
PROB = 24 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 5.03 mo.
min.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 5.00 mo.
min.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
IP = 2.96 mo.
min.
RS = 57.03 mo.
min.
IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 59.03 mo.
min.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., concur.

319. Due to his classification in the state coding system, this Article treats offender JAB as having one sentencing proceeding for three charges of conviction.
See supra note 193.
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Grade; Offense Label;
PRS
Year of
Statutory Citation
Sentence/
Offender
ID
2011/
M-1; Theft - Deception; $200– 3
MLA
$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3922

[Vol. 62: p. 685
OGS

3

Disposition

IP = 1.48 mo.
min.
RS = 58.46 mo.
min.
IP = 1.97 mo.
min.
PROB = 82.00
mo. min.,
consec.
IP = 2.96 mo.
min.
RS = 57.00 mo.
min.

2010/
TWJ

REFL 3
F-3; Criminal Trespass—
buildings; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3503(a)(1)(i)

2010/
CLM

M-1; DUI: General
Impairment/Incapable of
Driving Safely—(refused
testing)—2nd offense; 75 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3802(a)(1)
M-3; Disorderly Conduct; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(b)
M-3; Accident Involving
Damage to Attended Vehicle
or Property; 75 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 3743(b)
M-2; Resisting Arrest; etc.; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104

0

5

0

1

0

1

0

2

M-2; Simple Assault; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 2701(b)
M-3; Disorderly Conduct; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(b)
M-1; Identity Theft—total
value < $2000; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 4120(c)(1)(i)
M-1; Access Device Fraud—
att./obtain $50 < $500; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 4106(c)(1)(ii)
M-1; Theft - Deception; $200–
$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3922
M-1; Theft - Unlawful Taking;
$200–$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons
Stat. § 3921

0

3

0

1

1

3

1

4

PROB = 60 mo.
min., consec.

1

3

PROB = 60 mo.
min., consec.

1

3

PROB = 60 mo.
min., consec.

2010/
CLM
2010/
CLM

2010/
SJT

2010/
SJT
2010/
SJT
2010/
CMK
2010/
CMK
2010/
CMK
2010/
CMK

PROB = 12 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., concur.

IP = 0.99 mo.
min.
RS = 21.03 mo.
min.
PROB = 24 mo.
min., consec.
PROB = 12 mo.
min., concur.
INC = 6 - 23.49
mo.
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Grade; Offense Label;
PRS
Year of
Statutory Citation
Sentence/
Offender
ID
2010/
M-1; Theft - Deception; $200– 1
CMK
$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3922
0
2010/
F-3; Retail Theft JXR
3rd/subsequent offense; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3929(b)(iv)

OGS

745

Disposition

3

PROB = 60 mo.
min., concur.

3

IP = 1.48 mo.
min.
PROB = 58.55
mo. min.,
consec.
IP = 2.96 mo.
min.
PROB = 57.00
mo. min.,
consec.
IP = 2.96 mo.
min.
PROB = 57.00
mo. min.,
consec.
PROB = 36 mo.
min., consec.

2010/
TRM

M-1; DUI: Highest Rate of
Alcohol—(BAC .16+)—2nd
offense; 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3802(c)

0

5

2010/
TRM

M-1; DUI: Highest Rate of
Alcohol—(BAC .16+)—2nd
offense; 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3802(c)

0

5

2010/
TRM

M-1; Theft - Unlawful Taking; 0
$200–$2,000; 18 Pa. Cons
Stat. § 3921

3

